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Introduction
In today's climate of widespread public dissatisfaction with the
American legal system, evaluation of judges has become quite popular.
Seen as a means of improving the performance of judges, and of
keeping judges accountable to the public, evaluation is touted as a
solution of near be-all and end-all proportions.' Members of the public
see evaluation of judges, including administrative law judges (ALJs),
as the answer to the problem of an arrogant judiciary, unconcerned with
the real problems of real people, and feel that through evaluations, they
should be able to hold judges accountable, not only for their overall
judicial conduct and legal ability, but also for the impact of their
decisions in communities.
2
'Northwestern University Professor of Law and Political Science Victor Rosenblum,
in a report prepared in 1983 for the Administrative Conference of the United States, observed
of evaluation generally that it "is, in some circles, the magic elixir that increases efficiency and
effectiveness and identifies wasteful people and programs." Victor Rosenblum, Evaluation of
Administrative Law Judges: Aspects of Purpose, Policy, and Feasibility I (Dec. 1983) (copy
on file with the NAALJ Journal at Loyola University Chicago School of Law).2One example of this is found in a Jan. 12, 1996, letter to the editor of THE
TENNESSEAN, Nashville's morning newspaper, in which the writer complained of criminal
offenders serving little time in prison and a third of violent crimes being committed by
probationers and parolees, and asked, "Is not this a problem of judges and parole boards? Who
judges their performance?" The writer continued:
A television expose told of militia groups setting up their own 'courts'
with their own judges. This shows the frustration with the present system.
Why can't we devise a method of performance evaluation of the results of
the actions of our judges and parole board - and an annual report to the
public? Finally, we need a way to remove those who fail these standards.
Howard D. Meek, Letter to the Editor, THE TENNEsSEAN, Jan. 12, 1996, at 12A.
United States House of Representatives Majority Whip Tom DeLay's call to impeach
federal judges whose rulings are "particularly egregious," because "Congress has given up its
responsibility in [overseeing] judges and their performance on the bench," appears to represent
a similar anger at the judiciary and a wish to hold judges accountable for particular decisions
that may be unpopular with a segment of the population. See Editorial, Some Dangerous Talk
About Federal Judges, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 21, 1997, at 12A; Michael Kelly, TRB from
Washington, "Judge Dread," The New Republic, March 31, 1997, at 6. Constitutional
amendments ending lifetime federal judicial appointments or submitting them to re-
confirmation every few years have also been proposed, and been criticized as leading to the
"end [of] the independence of federal courts and opening] judges to charges of playing politics
with rulings." Penny Bender, "Lawmakers Get Call to Impeach [U S. District Court Judge
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The legal community as well appears to have largely bought into
evaluation ofjudges as a good idea, with a significant number of states
and the Navaho Nation now having judicial branch evaluation systems
either established or under development,3 and with evaluation of state
John T.] Nixon, " THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 3, 1997, at 1 A.
In response to the Tennessean editorial, which cautioned about the dangers of
DeLay's proposal to the concept of an independent judiciary, the writer of another letter to the
eltor -t ..... U but.... ..... . uoan is quite another. . . . I DeLay s
method may appear to be madness to many scholars and elites. But the fact is that there is a
tremendous desire from many people to do something positive about a judiciary system that
has run amok." Steve Head, Letter to the Editor, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 24, 1997, at 12A.
3In 1993 there were I 1 states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Utah) and the Navaho Nation
with established judicial evaluation systems, nine more states (Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and
Washington) and Puerto Rico with systems under development, and one additional state(Delaware) with a system under consideration. State Court Organization 1993, by David B.
Rottman, published by the Conference of State Court Administrators and the National Center
for State Courts, Jan. 1995, NCJ-148346. As of 1995, Tennessee was developing ajudicial
evaluation program (which is now in effect), and Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina
were also in the process of developing programs. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
HANDBOOK, 1996, American Bar Association National Conference of State Trial Judges.
Despite a recommendation in an August 1993 Report of the National Commission
on Judicial Discipline and Removal, that judicial evaluation programs be adopted for the
federal courts, the only form of evaluation under cnsideration at that time was self-evaluation
by the judges, see James P. Timony, Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law
Judges, 7 ADMIN. L. J. 629, 655 at n. 142 (1993), and there are presently no official or formaljudicial evaluation systems in any of the federal court districts or circuits. Interview with
Deputy Public Information Officer Karen Redmond, of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (Mar. 25 1997). However, biannual reports are required to be made on cases
pending longer than specified time periods (from 6 months up to over three years), courts do
informally monitor caseloads of judges, and some courts informally send questionnaires to
lawyers. In addition, in the district courts, performance reviews of magistrates are done, andjudges are aware of the views of lawyers on their performance through such publications as the
Legal Almanac. Id.
With regard to Tennessee's system, an article in the July 1, 1996, Tennessean noted
that just as the state appellate judges were about to institute a judicial evaluation system,
"[I]ower-level judges [were] clamoring to be included in the sort ofjob appraisal that looks like
the annual review now in use at many corporations." Larry Daughtrey, Grade Us, Say Trial
Judges, as Appeals Judges Will be, THE TENNESSEAN, JULY 1, 1996, at lB. The article
continued, "Leaders of the low-key reform effort say their intention is to make the state's
courts less intimidating and to give voters a better basis for an informed decision [on the
retention of appellate judges] at the ballot box." The evaluations of trial court judges, who
run in partisan elections, would not be made public and would be only for self-improvement.
Tennessee's judicial evaluation program includes the production, by a judicial evaluation
commission, of reports evaluating appellate judges based on information from judges, lawyers,
and court personnel. These reports are made public prior to retention elections, in contrast to
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ALJs, in various forms, being a reality in most states.4
Increased oversight and evaluation of ALJs have been advocated
based on such justifications as improving ALJ skills and the quality of
ALJ performance, 5 increasing ALJ efficiency and productivity,
6
combating bias and promoting consistency in ALJ decision-making,7
the confidential process whereby trial court judges select other judges to evaluate them for self-
improvement purposes. As with other state judicial evaluation systems, responses by judges
are permitted. Finally, judicial independence was one of the main concerns when the
development of the program began three years ago, and the key to achieving self-improvement
without compromising independence was considered to be selecting evaluation criteria that
avoided any relationship to case outcomes. Interview with Harlan Goan, Assistant Director,
Tennessee Judicial Performance & Evaluation Program, (Mar. 27 1997). See TENN. CODE
ANN.§17-4-201 1994.
4April 7, 1997, Interview with Bruce T. Cooper, Administrative Law Judge with the
Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings, and Chair of the NAALJ Judicial Evaluation
Committee. According to Judge Cooper, this is especially the case in those states with central
panels; other ALJs have suggested that evaluation of ALJs is found more often in agency AUJ
offices. The evaluation committees of the NAALJ and the ABA National Conference of
Administrative Law Judges are presently, on a joint basis, surveying and analyzing the
practices of the various states, but there are no actual statistics on this as yet. It is noted that
some federal administrative judges and hearing officers may also be evaluated; however,
evaluation by agency personnel of federal administrative law judges appointed pursuant to 5
U.S.C. §3105 is not permitted, see note 32, infra, and attempts to establish such evaluation
systems have been opposed by ALJs, on the grounds that this would impede judicial
independence. See, e. g., Timony, Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law
Judges, 7 ADMIN. L. J. 629 (1993); see also note 32.
'See, e.g., Rosenblum, supra, note 1, at 72-73. The former Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) in its Recommendation 92-7, 1 C.F.R. §305.92-7, 57
F. Reg. 250, Dec. 29, 1992, concerning the Federal Administrative Judiciary, would take the
goal of improving ALJ performance to the extent of having chief ALJs evaluate ALJs on their
adherence or nonadherence to agency policy. Richard Sippel's article in this issue of the
NAALJ Journal covers this subject very well, and, other than to agree that such evaluation
could compromise judicial independence, ethics, and collegiality, this author will not
specifically address the contents of Recommendation 92-7 in this regard. See also Ronnie A.
Yoder, Evaluation: Where Are We? Where Are We Going? 14 J. NAALJ 303, 309 (1994), in
which Yoder observes that "evaluations, particularly when tied to 'compliance with agency
policy' and separated from 'good cause' discipline before an impartial adjudicator is an
invitation to agency coercion - subtle or not-so-subtle - of ALJ independence."
6See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an
Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589 (1994).
7See ACUS Recommendation 92-7, supra n. 5. ("[A]gencies have a legitimate
interest in being able to manage their employees, including ALJs, in order to ensure that the
adjudicatory system is an efficient and fair one.") See also Elaine Golin, Solving the Problem
of Gender and Racial Bias in Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1532, 1544
(1995) (addressing statistical analyses that have shown racial disparities in Social Security
hearing outcomes).
Columbia Law Professor Richard Pierce has a somewhat different perspective on the
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issue of bias. Pierce argues that "agency policy should reflect bias -- the bias of Congress or,
in the absence of legislative expression of that bias, the bias of the President." Pierce,
Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from
Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481,486 (1990); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS
AND RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMMnSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 3d. Ed., §9.10, at 103. The
type of bias Pierce contemplates in this statement is obviously quite different from the sort of
bias Golin sees as a problem. Indeed, he calls consistency in decision-making an important due
process value. Supra Pierce, at 512. On the appropriate methods to achieve such consistency,
Pierce argues that the Social Security Adminiktratinn'c Pfforte in the !980s to mandote the
proportions of decisions granting and denying benefits were "entirely proper," and asserts that
the Supreme Court would uphold such methods and reverse lower court decisions that have
struck such efforts down. Id. at 483-4.
Pierce's perspective on the extent of oversight ofjudicial decision-making that would
be proper is perhaps best illustrated by a passage from his article in which he raises several
questions, to demonstrate his theory that federal judges are, inappropriately, unwilling to allow
politicians to make policy decisions, because of a combined "ignorance of alternative
decisionmaking procedures [and] a distinct bias rooted in their role in government" Id. at 516.
Pierce on federal judges:
Judges control the judicial decisionmaking process. The identification of
weaknesses in that process, or alternatives that perform better in some
contexts, threatens their self-image. Many are unwilling to admit that, in
some contexts, judicial decisionmaking is absurdly expensive, highly
subjective, and rife with inconsistency. Moreover, initiatives like the
SSA's efforts to control the conduct of its ALJs strike far too close to
federal judges' own turf. What if some institution actually began to
monitor the productivity and inter-judge consistency of the federal bench?
What if such an investigation detected major differences in productivity
and large inconsistencies in outcomes? If the SSA can exercise control
over the productivity and consistency of its ALJs, perhaps some institution
has the power to exercise analogous control over federal judges. In short,
federal judges are biased decisionmakers when they draw lines between
permissible political control of agency policymaking and impermissible
bias in agency decisionmaking.
Id. at 516-517. Pierce recognizes in a footnote that "[s]tatistically-based measures, analogous
to the SSA's benchmarks for ALJs, would be a poor method of controlling federal judges.
Statistical measures of performance would be valid only if judges were randomly assigned
large numbers of relatively homogenous cases." Id.
But see Timony, Performance Evaluation, supra note 3, at 639, in which Judge Timony
points out that there are certain types of cases heard by federal judges that seem to have as
many similarities as Social Security disability cases. ("Prisoner petitions, bankruptcy petitions,
and run-of-the-mill criminal and civil cases seem to have as many similarities as disability
cases."). Id.
Without trying to compete with my law school professor who once wrote an article with
a seven-page footnote, I would question whether Pierce's analysis omits a crucial inquiry: How
will the performance of the investigators, monitors, and evaluators of judicial performance be
monitored, evaluated, and judged, and who will be the last-resort, final judge/evaluator? The
professor seems to believe that there is "some institution" somewhere that has the capability
to reach appropriate judgments about the performance ofjudges that either could or should not
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and encouraging positive reinforcement for ALJs who perform well.'
All of these are worthy ends. However, it is the contention of this
article that, unless sufficient attention is paid to the means used to
achieve such ends, and to the need to protect judicial independence 9 on
be questioned (and despite the question form used and the limiting footnote, he appears to
believe this with regard to both ALJs and judicial branch judges). He further seems to believe
(with regard to statistical information about ALJ cases and decisions) that statistics are never
misleading or manipulable, and that the final arbiter of questions of judicial performance
should be a political entity or person. His analysis in effect questions many of the fundamental
premises of our legal and governmental system, including the recognition that, although no
form of decision-making will ever be perfect, there is a need for some last-resort process for
deciding disputes; that the procedures generally encompassed in the judicial decision-making
model - refined continuously over time through both the common law and statutory law- are
what this society has arrived at as the best such last-resort process; that this process has, at least
to the present date, held up in our system of checks and balances; and that an evidentiary
hearing, with parties present, with notice and opportunity to respond to allegations, with a
neutral decision-maker(s) required to make a decision based on the record produced at such
hearing, and with the right of appeal, is an integral part of such a last-resort process.
Although it is no doubt true that there are biased judges, it is questionable whether more
oversight ofjudges of the sort Professor Pierce advocates will, on balance, reduce the incidence
of such bias overall, given the danger of chilling independent and impartial decision-making
that can result from such oversight. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PRACTICE, §6.7[2] at 218-219 (1985, Pocket Part 1997); Barry v. Bowen, 825
F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1987), appeal after remand 884 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1989) and cases
cited therein. Judicial independence is protected, and judges are required to comply with
requirements that place stringent limitations on their activities in general, in order to assure
that they are as neutral, impartial, fair and unbiased as possible in their decisions. (Other
aspects of the legal system as well serve to assure that this goal is achieved: the adversary
system of justice, rules of evidence, etc.)
Certainly, as discussed in the text of the article, judicial branch judges and ALJs should
monitor and police themselves, appropriately, and where necessary, standards of conduct and
enforcement of such standards through complaint and disciplinary procedures should be
strengthened. However, to allow the sort of oversight Professor Pierce advocates would in
effect substitute, in the place of a hearing conducted pursuant to principles of due process, a
new last-resort decision-making process at the evidentiary hearing level. Such a process
would have no built-in protections such as those that have been developed over time in the
judicial model. Moreover, any such oversight process would itself -- to follow Pierce's
argument to its logical conclusion - require some oversight from yet another institution, to
assure that it is consistent, fair, appropriate, etc. The image of looking into a mirror facing
another mirror and seeing an infinite number of images receding into the background comes
to mind.
'KOCH, supra note 7, §6.3 at 207 (Pocket Part 1997).
9See Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 27: "Because judges are so often thrust into bitter
social controversies, the 'first principle' in any judicial evaluation system is the obligation to
preserve the independence necessary for judges to perform properly the judicial task."
Rosenblum goes on to observe:
No well-structured judiciary can disregard the fundamental value of public
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a practical and human basis, the costs of such oversight and evaluation
may outweigh any potential benefits.
It is therefore of crucial importance to analyze closely, in light of
available knowledge, the full range of possible unintended
consequences of any proposed evaluation standards and procedures. In
this regard, modem management research and theory suggest that
traditional performance evaluation, based on management by objectives
and the grading or ranking of those evaluated on point scales, can
nrndiinp. iinintp.ndd n.antiv, r.nnQtniiPnP.c thnt may nnrnnrnmise the
integrity of administrative adjudicative systems.
Indeed, the more that effective job performance in any field
accountability in a democracy; and everyone involved in and affected by
the judicial system deserves assurance that the system can and will
respond to allegations of unfitness . . . .A featured place on judicial
evaluation agendas must be accorded the issue of how best to identify 'the
threshold of pettiness' that can achieve the best possible accommodation
between principles ofjudicial independence and public accountability.
Id. at 28. See inffra note 123, on the particulars of Rosenblum's suggested evaluation program
for ALJs.
See also Diana Farthing-Capowich, Designing Programs to Evaluate Judicial
Performance, 9 ST. CT. J. 22, 23 (1985):
[W]here the product is justice, both output and the quality of the product are
difficult to delineate, monitor, and assess. Furthermore, the legal and
philosophical underpinnings of the judicial system encompass the broader
concepts of judicial independence and social organization and stability.
Evaluation of the judiciary must not encroach upon judges' ability to render
decisions in a truly impartial fashion (e.g., the scope of evaluation programs
should not include ideological review).
See also L. Hope O'Keeffe, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation, and
Production Standards: Judicial Independence versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 591, 626 (1986):
At a minimum, a properly designed evaluation program must protect
judicial independence, guarantee procedural fairness and substantive
impartiality in the program's design and implementation, and accord due
consideration to the quality as well as the quantity of ALJs' decisions.
Anything less might increase the accountability of ALJs at the risk of
imperiling their independence and the integrity of the APA's system of
adjudication. (Citations omitted.)
The ways in which evaluation can compromise independent thinking, in more subtle ways than
many have perhaps considered, has been addressed in management literature, which is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 61-86. The ways in which independent and impartial
decision-making can be compromised has also been addressed in the legal literature. See text
accompanying notes 40-47. See also, infra, discussion of unintended consequences of
performance evaluation.
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involves independent decision-making, the less effective traditional
performance evaluation may be in producing quality, and quantity, in
performance. According to recent innovative management studies,
such evaluation and other ranking mechanisms can tend to create "yes"
men and women, compromise productivity and morale, decrease
efficiency, and be corrupted by bias and favoritism.10 This is
particularly undesirable in a system that is held out to the public as
assuring neutral and fair decision-making on important matters in
people's lives.
The first section of this article consists of a review of the current
context ofjudicial evaluation. An understanding of the setting in which
most calls for judicial evaluation arise and in which evaluation
programs are implemented is helpful, in order to appreciate fully the
possible effects and consequences of such evaluation. Without such a
real-world perspective on judicial evaluation, any analysis will likely
be purely theoretical and of little value. Careful examination of the
real-world context for such evaluation provides a basis, both for a
clearer view of the subject in light of relevant legal and management
principles, and for more practical and effective application of
appropriate principles.
In Section II of the article, I propose that any programs to evaluate
administrative law judges should be grounded in three fundamental
values or premises: A. that the basic principles of the American legal
system -- as neutral as possible application of case precedent and
lawfully enacted and promulgated statutes and rules, rather than justice
according to personal or political viewpoints of what is right -- should
equally apply in the administrative legal system; B. that independent
decision-making -- an integral part of the American legal system -- is
likewise an indispensable part of the administrative legal system, and
should be viewed less as a power than as a responsibility, which
demands serious commitment -- and sometimes courage" -- on the part
of ALJs, and is not easily fulfilled; and C. that sound, effective
management principles that promote the values of the American legal
system and independent decision-making should guide the management
'°See infra text accompanying notes 61-86.
"See Penny J. White, Judicial Courage and Judicial Independence, XVI J. NAALJ
161 (Winter 1996).
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of administrative adjudicative systems, including any evaluation of
ALJs -- defined broadly as any standards-setting and enforcement with
regard to ALJs.
With these premises, and with the assistance of some research and
theory on performance evaluation from the field of management and
economics, I will then, in Section III, consider the purposes of
evaluation, and address some of the ways in which traditional ALJ
evaluation systems can have unintended consequences that may
negatively affect the performance of ALJs in fulfilling their central duty
to decide cases independently, impartially, and fairly.
Section IV of the article contains suggestions for crafting a system
-- either from the ground up or as a modification of an existing system
-- that will best promote the responsibility of independent decision-
making, and most effectively enhance the quality, efficiency,
productivity, and fairness of ALJ performance.
Finally, in the conclusion of the article, I propose that creating
standards-setting and enforcement systems that take into account the
basic principles of the American legal system, and what we can learn
from the field of management, should both improve AU performance
and encourage AU fulfillment of the responsibility of independent
decision-making, and should thereby more effectively and appropriately
address public discontent with the legal system, through reassurance
that the system is in fact fair, as it is intended to be.
I. Judicial Evaluation: The Current Context
Both judicial branch judges and administrative law judges function
in the real world of public opinion, politics, and public budgets.
Notwithstanding efforts to insulate judges from political and other
influences, these realities are always there, in the background, capable
of exerting sometimes very real pressures on both federal and state
judges and ALJs at all levels, whether for good or bad depending upon
the point of view. 2 The present relationship between the legal/judicial
system and the public may, at the very least, be described as one
containing elements of tension: between respect and less temperate
2See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also infra note 93.
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points of view, and between ideas ofjudicial accountability and judicial
independence. These elements of tension play a significant role in
discussions of judicial evaluation.
The importance of maintaining judicial independence is generally
acknowledged and emphasized among those in the legal community,
and indeed today is a subject that is given much attention, with the last
issues of both Judicature and The Judges' Journal devoted to this
subject. 3 However, except in the context of the administrative
judiciary, 4 the fundamental propriety of the evaluation ofjudges as it
"See 80 JUDICATURE (Jan.-Feb. 1997); 36 JUDGES' JOURNAL (Winter 1997). It is
noted that in some quarters there is no presumption of independence in ALJ decision-making;
for example, it has been observed that "the employer-employee relationship between agencies
and ALJ's gives rise to a public perception that ALJ's are not unbiased or impartial judges."
Karen S. Lewis, Administrative Law Judges and the Code of Judicial Conduct: A Need for
Regulated Ethics, 94 DICK. L. REV. 929, 930-931 (Summer 1990). Indeed, there are those who
argue in favor of limiting ALJ independence. See, for example, supra note 7. However, it is
generally agreed that ALJs should be independent adjudicators, in order to satisfy basic values
of due process. See infra text accompanying note 51. The more relevant debate usually
centers on how, as a practical matter, to balance judicial independence with accountability. See
Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Maintaining the Balance Between Judicial Independence and
Accountability in Administrative Law, in this issue of the NAALJ Journal.
14There is a significant body of literature on the propriety of evaluating and otherwise
overseeing the work of ALJs, primarily concerning federal ALJs, primarily Social Security
ALJs. This article refers to some of this, but does not purport to exhaustively address such
sources. This article is intended to approach the issues from a broader perspective,
encompassing state as well as federal ALJs, and considering management as well as legal
sources. Since the author's experience is as a state ALJ, the article may reflect this perspective;
however, the principles addressed are intended to have more general application.
It is noted that, in this article, the term administrative law judge or ALJ will be used,
and is intended to include all those who decide administrative law cases after holding
evidentiary hearings in which records are created and which are governed by administrative
procedures acts or similar law or regulation, whether they be called administrative law judge,
administrative judge, hearing officer, hearing examiner, or any other appellation. Also, while
the author is a lawyer and the article may reflect this in sometimes appearing to assume that
ALJs are always lawyers, it is recognized that many ALJs (whatever they are called) are not
lawyers, and that non-lawyer ALJs can be good ALJs. However, the author strongly believes
that all the legal principles discussed in the article apply equally to non-lawyer ALJs, since as
ALJs they are performing a legal function subject to the same fundamental requirements of due
process and fairness that govern the actions of any ALL They should also be held to the same
standards ofjudicial courage of which former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny J. White
so eloquently spoke at the November, 1996, Annual Meeting and Conference of the NAALJ.
See note 11, supra. It is furthermore recognized that lawyers have no special abilities in this
regard, notwithstanding that the law can help us to define more clearly when and how it may
be necessary to exercise courage, and can be a strong support when such exercise becomes very
difficult to undertake or sustain.
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relates to judicial independence has not been extensively disputed in the
literature, to the knowledge of the author.I5
Commissions and committees studying and/or implementing
judicial evaluation systems in the court system see judicial
independence as a central concern, in the context of arriving at
appropriate criteria and procedures for evaluating judges, 16 but appear
generally to conclude that the benefits of judicial evaluation outweigh
the dangers of compromising judicial independence, or that any such
CIoUi-njIU-11r- c 41 U aVUUU UUUIg tI.d Ul UV±ILtmmtu mm U1 VVa UaLu1L
criteria. Indeed, it has been stated that performance evaluations of
judges, in addition to providing valuable feedback to judges on how
well they are carrying out their duties, "also preserve judicial
independence by focusing the electorate away from individual judicial
decisions and more properly toward the judge's overall performance as
"
5Judge Irving Kaufman's observation, that "statutes that vest independent entities,
groups of judges, or private individuals with authority to reward or punish judges based on
their performance" were "questionable," is noted. Irving R. Kaufman, The Fssence of Judicial
Independence, COLUM. L. REV. 671, 696 (1980) (citations omitted). Also noted is Judge
Randall R. Rader's recognition that "[flor both federal and state judges, the major obstacle to
attorney evaluation is the perception of a threat to judicial independence." U. S. Court of
Appeals Judge Randall R. Rader (D. C. Circuit), Evaluate Your Own Performance on the
Bench, 30 JuI ES' JOuRNAL 32, 34 (Summer 1991). Judge Rader considered such resistance
to evaluation on the part of judges to be "natural": "Judges, after all, must enforce the law
without regard to perceptions, criticisms, or public opinion, [and] remember well, when they
were practicing lawyers, the spontaneous, unflattering evaluations they gave to judges when
they were ruled against." He concluded that "[o]ne overriding consideration ... counsels
judges to seek evaluation. Judges control lives and destinies in their decisions. Therefore, a
judge has a professional responsibility to seek every credible avenue of self-improvement."
Id Judge Rader observed that "[t]he real question is how to solicit feedback without harming
judicial independence," and suggested the necessity of a confidential and candid atmosphere,
and the use of evaluations for self-improvement. Id.
See also Richard Aynes, "Evaluation of Judicial Performance: A Tool for Self-
Improvement," 8 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 311 (1981). Aynes likewise advocated the use of
evaluation for self-improvement, observing that evaluation of the performance of judges has
been called "inevitable," because it is already taking place "every day in a hundred different
ways by thousands of different individuals," including the media, in "often superficial" ways.
"The only question is whether there should be a formalized, structured effort on behalf of the
profession to utilize the evaluation that is already taking place to enhance the quality of the
judiciary."
Despite such sources as these, there appears to be little literature on the subject of the
dangers to judicial independence that may be involved in non-confidential evaluation of
judges, in which judges may be rated, and which may have an effect on the job security of
judges.
'
6See, e.g., interview with Harlan Goan, supra, note 3.
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a public servant."'1
7
Nonetheless, while judicial evaluation commissions, and the
judicial and legal community in general, may be cognizant of the need
to avoid compromising judicial independence, the general public is less
likely to be. Reacting with fear, anger, and impatience to their own
perceptions of problems that have caused them or others known to them
real difficulty and pain, citizens express their concerns with an
emotional urgency that tends to elicit popular sympathy and drive
public opinion."8 Whereas in the past the role of the judge was
'Editorial on judicial independence, 80 JUDICATURE 152 (1997). Addressing the
issue of concrete means by which an independent judiciary can be maintained, the editorial
continues:
While judges must be free to use their best legal judgment in reaching
decisions regardless of how unpopular those decisions may be, in no way
does judicial independence give carte blanch to judges to violate the code
of judicial conduct or otherwise fail to perform their duties responsibly.
Over the years [the American Judicature Society] has recognized this
through activity in two areas: judicial performance evaluations and
judicial conduct and ethics.
Observing that "a truly independent judiciary is possible only when the public accepts the
legitimacy of judicial authority," the editorial notes the present apparent erosion of public
confidence in the judiciary, calls for judges to reach out in educational forums outside the
courtroom, and concludes that, "[i]f the role of the courts in our democracy is not thoroughly
explained to the public, the public is susceptible to misleading or inaccurate information that
threatens the maintenance of an independent third branch of government." See also Frances
Kahn Zemans, From Chambers to Community, 80 JUDICATURE 62 (Sept.-Oct. 1996).
It may be observed that, if the judicial branch of government is having a difficult
time explaining its role to the public, the administrative judiciary's ability to explain its role
in a way that is understandable to the public (and indeed, to other governmental officials) may
be said to be even more problematic. In this vein, the relative lack of prestige of ALJs may,
ironically, stand us in good stead with a public that is suspicious of judges it perceives to be
"arrogant" How to maintain respect for the integrity of the proceedings we conduct, while at
the same time avoiding the appearance of being arrogant - in the face of the perception by
many ALJs of a dismissive inclination toward the ALJ role (and even the use of the term
"judge") on the part of some in the legal, governmental, and academic communities - is a
challenge ALJs must continually address.
"On the power of public opinion, as early as 1835 Alexis De Tocqueville predicted
that "faith in public opinion will become ...a species of religion [in the United States], and
the majority its ministering prophet." ALEXIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,
1840, THE HENRY REEVE TEXT, Part II, First Book at 11. (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A.
Knopf, 1945). Further, more ominously:
[]n a democratic country ...public favor seems as necessary as
the air we breathe, and to live at variance with the multitude is, as it were,
not to live. The multitude require no laws to coerce those who think not
like themselves: public disapprobation is enough; a sense of their
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considered to be unquestionably respectable if not sacrosanct, 9 in
present times harsh attacks on judges and other public figures are
common.2" And just as public outrage has manifested itself in attempts
to oust judges whose decisions do not please critical quotients of the
voting populace,2 it has surely played a role in the growing popularity
loneliness and impotence overtakes them and drives them to despair.
• . . In whatever way the powers of a democratic community may be
vigidIILcu dInu DaianL1G, IL WIE aiwaya UV AIUGIIIVIy UIII..UIRL LU U'.iil%..¥
what the bulk of the people reject or to profess what they condemn.
Id., Part II, Third Book, at 261. And moreover, in De Tocqueville's view, "the government
likes what the citizens like, and naturally hates what they hate." Id. at 295.
9See infra note 39.
"It may fairly be observed that those of us who are lawyers may share responsibility
for the low levels to which public discourse in and about the legal system has sunk. ABA
President N. Lee Cooper has called for a reversal of the "decline of civility" in our justice
system. President's Message, 83 A.B.A.J. 8 (March 1997). See also Marvin E. Aspen, What
We Can Do About the Erosion of Civility in Litigation, 35 JUDGES' JOURNAL 32, 35 (Fall
1996), in which leadership on the part ofjudges is called for to promote civility in the practice
of law and "to renew respect for, and confidence in, the judicial system"; and Charles
Mahtesian, Supreme Chaos, GOVERNING, (July 1996) at 40, in which allegations of
conspiracies, phone-tapping, case-fixing, sexual harassment, secret slush funds, wrestling
matches between judges, and payoffs on the part of State Supreme Court Judges, are described.
Whether the strong feelings that seem to underlie such uncivil interaction have
simply moved from parts of society where they always existed to quarters that were previously
more genteel is uncertain. Or perhaps it was always there but was just not reported, as
Mahtesian points out. Id. at 41. It has been observed that some of the political invective to be
heard and read in the early years of our democracy rivaled, if not surpassed, that heard today.
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present ofJudicial Independence, 80 JUDICATURE 117,
121 (Jan-Feb. 1997). It is also possible that the eruption of extreme sentiments in the arena of
law and public policy may be some sort of cyclical phenomenon, or the result of forces beyond
our ordinary perceptive powers - the equivalent, for example, of the fluttering of a butterfly's
wings that starts a movement of air that ends up as a tornado a continent away. JAMES GLEICK,
CHAOS - MAKING A NEw SCIENCE, 8, 322, n. 20 (1987). In any event, it seems clear that much
of the legal system perceives itself to be under attack (whether for valid or invalid reasons is
beyond the scope of this article), and the establishment of judicial evaluation systems appears
to be at least partially a defensive maneuver, even if self-improvement is part of the motivation
for the creation of such systems. See also supra. note 15.
21See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, 82 A.B.A. J. 50 (Nov. 1996), which begins,
"To some, the rash of political attacks on judges is an assault on the very concept of judicial
independence. To others, it is merely robust debate. Whatever the interpretation, the personal
tone of attacks on isolated decisions is shaking up the system." Id. The article describes
attacks on several judges, including Justice Penny J. White of the Tennessee Supreme Court,
who in August 1996 lost a retention vote after various groups campaigned against her, largely
on the basis of her vote in a single death penalty case, remanding the case for a new sentencing
hearing. Tennessee's evaluation program for judges in retention elections was not yet in place
at the time. Whether a favorable evaluation would have prevented the vote against Justice
White is an unanswerable question; future elections may provide insight in this regard.
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of evaluation, seen by some as a means of controlling judges as
perceived agents of the public.22
During such times of widespread public loss of faith in and respect
for formerly revered institutions, society goes through varying degrees
of upheaval, with factions at odds with each other on multiple,
overlapping fronts. This has been so in the administrative legal system
in recent years, and may be so to an even greater degree in the near
future. Change is proposed, or objected to, on the basis of grounds that
seem eminently reasonable to their champions, but time, political and
other pressures limit effective examination of all the potential
consequences of proceeding in one way or another. Public colloquy
often seems to follow the image of a pendulum that swings from one
end of a spectrum of possible viewpoints on an issue, to the other.23
The administrative adjudicatory system may be particularly subject
to attempts, by parties from all across the political/public policy
spectrum, to modify or modulate it. The prevalence of such efforts is
likely related to the status of the administrative law system as a
statutory and regulatory creation with no constitutional mandate or
'See supra note 2. There is little doubt that, whether or not articulated as such, the
view that all public officials including judges are not only servants, but also agents, of the
public, plays largely into much public discourse about evaluation of judges, sometimes with
little appreciation being shown for the subtleties of what constitutes the appropriate duties of
officials in all three branches of government. Professor Pierce has written on his agency theory
of government, arguing for more deference on the part of courts to agency policy-making when
reviewing the actions of administrative agencies. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989).
The proper extent and limits of public officials acting as agents of the public, and all the
ramifications of this issue, are beyond the scope of this paper, except incidentally in discussing
the issue of judicial independence. See also, supra note 7.
'De Tocqueville, in a particularly foreboding and dour state of mind:
It is believed by some that modem society will be always changing its
aspect; for myself, I fear that it will ultimately be too invariably fixed in
the same institutions, the same prejudices, the same manners, so that
mankind will be stopped and circumscribed; that the mind will swing
backwards and forwards forever without begetting fresh ideas; that man
will waste his strength in bootless and solitary trifling, and, though in
continual motion, that humanity will cease to advance.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, notel8, Part II, Third Book at 263. Although this passage has
fortunately proved to have been unduly pessimistic -- society has certainly advanced in many
ways - the maxim that "the more things change the more they stay the same" is not entirely
inapposite here. (Also French, from Alphonse Karr, Les Guepes, Jan. 1849: Plus Va change,
plus c 'est la mime chose.)
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stature, to its somewhat "hybrid" and not always well-understood
nature, to its position outside the judicial branch of government and
relatively lower perceived status in the legal hierarchy, and to its history
of competing interests, with differing values, trying to mold it to
conform to such values. The nature of the subject matter of
administrative law no doubt also attracts interest: public policy issues
of great concern to many in the government, legal, academic, corporate,
and public welfare communities, to name just a few. And of course, as
the Honorable ChArle 111 Bvon, T%^%% Cr-e1 +^ the17- D ;
noted in a speech at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the National
Association of Administrative Law Judges, "there are huge stakes, in
terms of human welfare [and] dollars, [and] there are huge political
stakes."24
The issue of performance evaluation of administrative law judges
is also illustrative of the unique nature of the administrative
adjudicative system, and of some ways in which ALJs and judicial
branch judges are perceived differently, above and beyond the obvious
fact that the two groups are formally in different branches of
government, even if "functionally comparable."25 While the issue of
evaluating ALJs may also be comparable to the issue of evaluating
judges in the judicial branch, in most discussions of evaluation of ALJs
significant differences are often presumed, including the degree of
control over judges that is implicitly deemed to be acceptable.2 6
24Tennessee Attorney General Charles W. Burson, Nov. 9, 1996, Address at NAALJ
Annual Meeting and Conference, on the subject of "The Future of Administrative Law."
General Burson observed, immediately before making the statement about the huge stakes that
are at issue in administrative hearings, that "[i]t is going to be an increasing challenge to
maintain your independence against tremendous pressures to conform to the needs of the
system -- 'Look, just get it out, just deny it. You know, if you rule this way, it's going to
disrupt this whole program."' (A tape-recording of General Burson's speech is on file with the
NAALJ Journal, at Loyola University Chicago School of Law).
' See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
2 Federal ALJs are not evaluated, but are subject to working conditions defined by
the agencies that pay them, in a way that judicial branch judges generally are not. See
O'Keeffe, supra, note 9, at 625; see also Nahum Litt, Doing It With Mirrors: The Illusion of
Independence of Federal Administrative Law Judges, 36 JUDGES' JouRNAL 27 (Spring 1997).
However, even in the judicial branch, there have been attempts to oversee the work
ofjudges. Some aspects of such efforts vis-A-vis the federal judiciary have been criticized as
constituting a threat to judicial independence by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his 1995 Year-End
Report of the Federal Judiciary (copy on file with the NAALJ Journal, at Loyola University
of Chicago School of Law). Addressing the plan of Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the
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Most significantly, whereas in the judicial branch evaluations of
judges are commonly done through bar surveys and/or by specially
appointed commissions,27 in the administrative law arena, although
some jurisdictions use survey instruments to obtain feedback from the
bar and other interested parties,28 when performance evaluation of
administrative law judges is considered or undertaken, the model is
often that of a supervisor evaluating a subordinate employee in a
traditional management-by-objectives context, or at least contains
aspects of such a process. Such a model would no doubt be considered
anathema in the judicial branch, comparable to the impropriety of a
superior judge attempting on an ex parte basis to influence another
judge with regard to issues in pending or impending cases.29
Issues such as these often arise in the ongoing debate about the
proper role of ALJs, their independence as decision-makers, and their
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, to send
questionnaires to all judges asking about the time they devote to judicial and related tasks, the
Chief Justice recognized that there was "no doubt that answers to some form of such questions
could aid Congress in making decisions about judicial salaries, permitted outside income from
teaching, creating new judgeships, and filling existing vacancies," but also observed that
"[tihere can also be no doubt that the subject matter of the questions and the detail required for
answering them could amount to an unwarranted nd ill-considered effort to micro-manage the
work of the federal judiciary." Id at 3. The Grassley questionnaire and its dissemination have
also been described as being meant as a "shot across the bow" of the federal judiciary, "clearly
understood to be such by all parties involved." Francis J. Larkin, The Variousness, Virulence,
and Variety of Threats to Judicial Independence, 36 JUDGES' JOURNAL 4, 45 (Winter 1997).
The Grassley questionnaires were distributed as planned; the Executive Committee
of the Judicial Conference of the United States issued a response in February 1996, noting that
the conference was pleased to cooperate fully in the survey and spelling out the "significant
cost savings and efficiencies that the judiciary is already achieving"; and the subcommittee
issued separate reports on the surveys of the U. S. Courts of Appeal and the U. S. District
Courts in May and August, respectively, of 1996. (Copies of the Judicial Conference
Response, along with copies of the Subcommittee Reports, obtained from the Administrative
Office of the U S. Courts, on file with the NAALJ Journal, at Loyola University Chicago
School of Law.)
27 See text accompanying note 121.
2
'See, Colorado Division of Administrative Hearings Biennial Report at 25-28, (June
1996). (Copy on file with the NAALJ Journal, at Loyola University of Chicago School of
Law.) Colorado's evaluation survey program is described in Edwin L. Felter, Jr.,
Administrative Adjudication Total Quality Management: The Only Way to Reduce Costs and
Delays Without Sacrificing Due Process, 15 J. NAALJ 5, 62 (Spring 1995).
29 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B(7), printed in full at
note 104. See also SHAMAN ET AL, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, 2d ed., 1995, §5.06, at
159.
XVII Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 18
accountability to the public. This debate shares many features of the
more general conflict today about the proper role ofjudges, and of the
legal system as a whole, in society.
Whether urgent enough to characterize as crisis, the delicate and
potentially volatile balance between societal distrust in the legal/judicial
system and the legal/judicial system's response thereto, has aspects of
crisis: We in the legal/judicial system as a whole, and in the
administrative adjudicatory system specifically, may well be in a time
.. 6 __,,A ---. . , & .. . 1-"-" " -- A - - "---- .. .. .. - [ r turin
01 al ~lu6C U11LIAULY, .LIU 4L U ucuibsve Illumunt [or] turning
point"3 with regard to resolution of the pivotal issue of how to protect
and maintain judicial independence in a democratic society,' and in an
imperfect.world. As is so often the case with questions of the political
ordering of society and its institutions, the resolution of this issue in the
context of calls (or, in some jurisdictions, requirements) for traditional
evaluation of administrative law judges, may consist not only in what
constitutes the best approach, but also in which approach involves the
fewest, and the least serious, problems.32 However, this does not
I°OxFoRD DICIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH USAGE (Second Edition 1993) at 200.31See infra note 39.
32As Utah Supreme Court Justice Christine M. Durham observes in her paper,
Judging in Context: A Discussion Outline, there really are "no solutions, only difficult
choices." Id., at 15 (July 1996). (Copy is on file with the NAALJ Journal at Loyola
University Chicago School of Law).
This article centers on evaluation of ALJs by supervisor or chief ALJs, peers,
evaluation commissions, and through surveys of the bar and parties who come before ALJs,
and not on what probably most ALJs, at least, would agree poses the greatest problems with
regard to the evaluation issue: the idea of ALJs being evaluated by agency personnel who may
have an interest in the outcomes of cases, which is prohibited for federal ALJs, but which
"[a]gencies [have been said to] gaze lustfully at [as] forbidden fruit," and which may exist for
some ALJs. See 5 U.S.C. §§4301(2)(D), 4302, 4303 (1982); see also O'Keeffe, supra, note
9, at 593-4, 595. The major problem, of course, in this regard is that any interest of such
agency personnel in the outcome of cases or classes of cases could obviously affect the
neutrality of decision-making by ALJs who are evaluated by such personnel, regardless of
whether or not there is any conscious intent to exert any improper influence. Also, persons
who are not judges will probably not have the special perspective and awareness of the judicial
code of conduct that judges should have, and may thereby overlook important issues of'judicial
independence.
Those who, like Pierce, believe that agencies not only have the right but the duty to
direct ALJ decision-making as a matter of policy, may never be convinced of the extent of the
real problems that inhere in agency oversight of ALJ performance, or of the propriety of using
a judicial model for ALJ decision-making. See supra note 7. However, it is suggested that,
for individual litigants, and for the overall system of administrative adjudication, a judicial
model is the best last-resort evidentiary decision-making model available. Some better
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minimize the importance, or the critical nature, of the questions, the
answers, and the manner in which the answers are reached and
implemented.
The Chinese word for "crisis" contains two characters: "wei,"
meaning danger, and "gee," meaning opportunity or chance. This is an
apt image and reference point when addressing these primary and
essential questions.
The present upheaval -- concerning both the legal/judicial system
generally and the administrative adjudicatory system specifically;
involving as it does such enormous human and financial stakes and
such compelling public policy issues; and occurring in a context of such
uncertainty, emotional turmoil,33 and tendency in this fast-paced world
to seek quick solutions to perceived problems -- creates both danger and
opportunity: danger that, in addressing perceived problems and
designing management and evaluation systems for ALJs, concern for
popular opinion and/or political considerations will be a primary
driving force, and inadequate attention will be paid to fundamental
legal principles of due process, judicial independence, and fairness to
all parties; and opportunity to revisit these basic principles from a fresh
alternative means of addressing agency policy concerns and concerns of consistency in
decision-making include such straightforward means as rulemaking, along with assuring the
continued existence of a high-quality administrative judiciary, through such means as those
proposed in this article.
"Such emotional turmoil likely includes not only obvious public anger, but also,
among other things, less obvious but very simple fear on the part of those under attack that
their jobs might be in danger. The popular media has for the past several years been covering
stories of the sometimes near-tragic results of "downsizing" in today's economy, and the trend
does not appear to be reversing itself yet. As a NEWSWEEK article about the "Dilbert" comic
strip phenomenon put it, "Downsizing. Dumb bosses. Double talk. Densification. That's
office life in America's favorite comic strip. Too bad reality is even worse." Describing
"Dilbert's World," the article continues, "And in the background, burning ever closer are the
fires of Competition, triggering the dread drums of Downsizing. 'Knock knock.' says the boss.
'Who's there?' asks the employee. The boss grins: 'Not you anymore!' NEWSWEEK, Aug.
12, 1996, at 53-55.
Taking just one state as an example, in 1997, Tennessee has abolished 1568
positions, of which 727 were occupied. These numbers do not include positions abolished in
1996 in cutbacks in the department of mental health. The state department of personnel has
engaged in ongoing efforts to place all laid-off employees, and had placed 120 as of March 26,
1997, and over 230 as of the end of April, 1997. Interview with Tennessee Employee
Relations Director Marianne Batey, Mar. 26, 1997; In Touch, April, 1997 (Monthly
publication of the Tennessee Department of Personnel; copy on file with the NAALJ Journal,
at Loyola University Chicago School of Law).
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perspective, en route to arriving at systems that better preserve both
judicial independence and judicial excellence, and also provide for
appropriate accountability to the public.
Along the way, it is appropriate to consider the concept of
"accountability," in light of both fundamental legal principles and the
basic respect all human beings surely owe each other as human beings
in a civilized society, at all levels. Modem management theory and
research, an area that (to the knowledge of the author) has rarely been
~,iaiJ',A ; A etnlaa-wh t~ e 11 A,.,1! , ,n+, .I .. ... K -.
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insights with regard to the ways in which human beings in
organizations interact, "judge" each other, and are held accountable for
how well they are perceived to produce.
How best to manage government organizations so as to achieve
quality, productivity, efficiency and fairness in serving the public is a
question that clearly applies to judicial systems. However, appropriate
means of managing judicial systems, including administrative judicial
systems, may differ from those that are appropriate for other systems,
especially with regard to evaluation ofjudges. While the stated goals
of many traditional performance evaluation programs are worthy -- to
provide constructive feedback so that those evaluated can improve their
job performance'M -- the actual effects of ill- or inadequately-considered
performance evaluation of judges can not only undermine productivity
from a management standpoint, they can also violate the fundamental
due process principle of a neutral, independent decision-maker.
34Scott Adams, creator of the Dilbert cartoons, offers the following perspective:
In theory, the performance review process can be thought of as a positive
interaction between a 'coach' and an employee, working together to
achieve maximum performance. In reality, it's more like finding a dead
squirrel in your backyard and realizing that the best solution is to fling it
onto your neighbor's roof. Then your obnoxious neighbor takes it off the
roof and flings it back, as if he had the right to do that. Ultimately,
nobody's happy, least of all the squirrel.
SCOT ADAMS, THE DILBERT PRINCPLE, 101- 102 (1996).
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II. Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges: Fundamental Premises
A. The American Legal System
The American legal system" is based on the idea that, in order to
more closely approximate "justice" and effectuate basic fairness,
disputes that cannot be resolved informally between parties, or in some
alternative agreed-upon manner, should be considered in a somewhat
formal context in which all parties have notice of and opportunity to be
heard on all issues, and should be resolved based on even-handed,
neutral application of the law (case law precedent, statutes, rules),
rather than on unfettered discretion, personal feeling and opinion, or
political or other inappropriate influence.36
This is true because we all have our own views of what is right, fair,
and just -- each of us, of course, reasonable in our own eyes, but
sometimes strongly disagreeing with others who feel themselves to be
just as reasonable. It was no doubt from this truth about human nature
3SThe author does not purport to be an expert on the American legal system at the
level of some serious scholars on the subject, but, as a lawyer and an administrative law judge,
and as a continuing student of the law, has developed some viewpoints on the basic framework
and philosophy of the American legal system, and has observed some areas of consensus in this
regard.
It is recognized that there are differing philosophies of law. For example, Justice
Christine M. Durham lists the following types of legal theories/viewpoints: Critical Feminist
Studies, Critical Race Studies, Gay Legal Studies, Legal Process Theory, Post-Structuralism,
Pragmatism, Law and Economics, Law and Society, Republicanism, Law and Literature, Post-
Modernism, Critical Legal Studies, and Public Choice, in addition to dualism and relativism.
Durham, supra note 32 at 11. Justice Durham proposes a new pragmatism, or contextualism,
as a synthesis of various legal theories; points out that the way we think and know influences
how we reach our decisions and affects our judging; and suggests that "[t]o avoid being
trapped by our own epistemological paradigms, we should try to view moral and intellectual
questions from as many angles as possible." Id. at 2.
The author in this part of this article is attempting to summarize some fundamental
legal and human principles on which there appears to be some level of consensus, whatever
legal theory or political or other viewpoint one may espouse.
31As stated by Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: "We must not establish our conclusions by
intense personal desire, keenly felt emotional belief, folklore, superstition, or dogmatic,
unquestioning acceptance. Rather, we must state grounds for our conclusion. A conclusion
cannot stand on its own direct account, but only on account of something else which stands as
'witness, evidence, voucher or warrant.' We have to see an objective connection leading from
that which we know to that which we don't know. . . ." RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR
LAWYERS - A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING, at 3-3 (1992).
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that the idea of following precedent arose -- rather than everything
being decided ad hoc, by whoever happened to have the most clout or
distinction at the time, the decision-maker was limited by the
commonly agreed upon requirement that the decision be based on how
other similar situations had been decided in the past. From this, the
concept of "equal justice under the law" was developed, through the
struggles of many human beings over the space of centuries. And, in
the words of Judge Irving R. Kaufman, "Adjudication based on the
prtl, ,.,. pt, ,,-,, Justice Lunder !w - ,,,, .,,-;l,, ,
impartiality demands freedom from political pressure.""
To be sure, there are alternative means of dispute resolution, and the
development of such alternatives as mediation and arbitration (which
often are governed under the legal system) is a welcome development
in today's legal community and among the public. However,
alternative means of dispute resolution may also include violence,3" and
political means, which unrestrained may lead to tyranny.39 And,
"Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L. J. 681,684 (1979).
3s "People forget that the whole way that English common law started was so that
people weren't punching each other out in the middle of the streets. It was a peaceful way to
resolve disputes . . . ." Interview with Ellen Hobbs Lyle, newly named Chancellor for
Davidson County, Tennessee (who hears appeals from administrative law cases in Tennessee),
Gerald Patterson, Ellen Hobbs Lyle named Chancellor, NASHVILLE B.J., July 1995, at 3.
"SeeDE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 18, Part I, on the "tyranny of the majority." In
Chapter XVI, entitled, "Causes Which Mitigate the Tyranny of the Majority in the United
States," the Frenchman counted the legal profession as one of the most important such causes.
Observing that "[t]he people in democratic states do not mistrust the members of the legal
profession, because it is known that they are interested to serve the popular cause; and the
people listen to them without irritation, because they do not attribute to them any sinister
designs," Id. at 275-276. He further stated, with no discernible trace of irony:
in America there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are apt to
mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class
and the most cultivated portion of society. They have therefore nothing
to gain by innovation, which adds a conservative interest to their natural
taste for public order. If I were asked where I place the American
aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation that it is not among the rich,
who are united by no common tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench
and the bar.
Id. at 278. However, more specifically, on the judiciary, he continued:
[T]he American magistrate perpetually interferes in political affairs. He cannot
force the people to make laws, but at least he can oblige them not to disobey
their own enactments and not to be inconsistent with themselves. I am aware
that a secret tendency to diminish the judicial power exists in the United States;
and by most of the constitutions of the several states the government can, upon
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however effective alternative means -- both the peaceful and
cooperative and the not so peaceful or cooperative -- may be, there must
always be a last-resort process for those disputes that parties cannot
resolve through alternative means. The American legal system
provides a last-resort means of resolving disputes that cannot be
resolved any other way. Thus, much in our broader
political/governmental system rests on how successful the legal system
is in reaching results that stand up over time.
So far, the American legal system appears to be the best model
available, in part because it is not a fixed or rigid set of "right answers,"
but is more a method for finding the answers that are as right as
possible for a particular situation, based on what has been done and/or
is required to be done in other similar situations. Our legal system is not
perfect, and human error is unavoidable even in a good system.
However, the legal system is structured to minimize human error
through a continuing process of systematic self-correction, which has
proven to be more reliable than other, more authoritarian systems, no
matter how benevolent the decision-makers.
In our system of justice, it is recognized that deciding cases based
on individual, political, or institutional opinions and viewpoints of what
the demand of the two houses of the legislature, remove judges from their
station. Some other state constitutions make the members of the judiciary
elective, and they are even subjected to frequent re-elections. I venture to
predict that these innovations will sooner or later be attended with fatal
consequences; and that it will be found out at some future period that by thus
lessening the independence of the judiciary they have attacked not only the
judicial power, but the democratic republic itself.
Id. at 279. According to De Tocqueville, "The strength of the courts of law has . . . been
the greatest security that can be offered to personal independence." DETOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 18, Part II, Fourth Book, ch. VII at 325. Reflecting upon these observations today, one
is struck not only with the obvious contrast between the trust in lawyers that De Tocqueville
perceived and the present distrust (manifested in anger and in "put-down" humor), and by his
predictive powers, but also with the possibility that the present turmoil is somehow akin to a
popular attempt to overthrow a perceived aristocracy. Whether it will be possible in the face
of such popular rebellion to maintain the legal system and the judiciary as truly independent
protectors of personal independence and of minorities against the tyranny of the majority, is
a question that concerns many. See supra note 13. As former Tennessee trial, appellate, and
Supreme Court Justice Penny White concluded, "Judicial independence is the backbone of the
American democracyL,] essential not only to the preservation of our system of justice, but the
preservation of our system of government as well." Penny J. White, An America Without
Justice, 80 JuDIcATURE 174 (Jan.- Feb. 1997).
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is right or just in a given situation, without the various procedural
protections of due process, is likely to be more subject to biases and
prejudices, however unconscious or unacknowledged, than is acting in
accordance with due process and other legal principles that have been
developed systematically over time and that are equally applicable to
all similarly-situated parties. The first fundamental premise of this
article is that the administrative legal system, including the setting and
enforcing of standards in regard to ALJ performance, should not be
exclh&AJ.%, or cx, .rn.w
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that underlie the American legal system.
B. Independent Decision-Making
1. The Nature of Independent Decision-Making
One of the central tenets of our legal system is the due process
concept that decision-makers must be independent, in order that they
can be neutral and impartial in their decisions. They must avoid, and
should be shielded as much as possible from, any influences that might
in any way compromise such independence, neutrality, and impartiality
-- in order that every person, rich or poor, of whatever standing in the
community, can receive equal justice based on the law and not on
preconceived notions or improper influences. In our legal system, it is
recognized that, despite the best of intentions, a decision-maker who
decides a case based in any way on influences and factors outside the
facts and law of the case, is more likely to reach an unfair decision than
is a decision-maker who makes a serious effort and commitment to
limit his or her inquiry to the facts and law of the case, in accordance
with ethical and other requirements imposed by law, independent of
outside influences, and even of the judge's own personal opinion, when
it conflicts with the law.
Indeed, a judge, Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed, "is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in
pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness."4 ° As former Chief
Justice Roger J. Traynor of California cautioned: "[O]ne entrusted with
'1BENJAMIN N. CARnozo, THE NATuRE OF ThE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 141 (1921).
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decision, traditionally above base prejudices, must also rise above the
vanity of stubborn preconceptions, sometimes euphemistically called
the courage of one's convictions. [A judge] must severely discount his
own predilections, of however high grade he regards them, which is to
say he must bring to his intellectual labors a cleansing doubt of his
omniscience, indeed even of his perception."' More recently, Justice
Breyer has summarized "[t]he question of judicial independence [as]
revolv[ing] around the theme of how to assure that judges decide
according to law, rather than according to their whims or to the will of
the political branches of government. 4
2
Unfair decisions may also occur "innocently," as a result of a
judge's lack of experience similar to that of litigants, or as a result of
unconscious biases and reactions,43 but the results for litigants may be
just as serious as if they were caused by blatant prejudice or clearly
coercive influence. Thus, it is important for judges to become as aware
as possible of our own biases, prejudices, propensities, and ways of
knowing and thinking, in order to avoid allowing these to improperly
influence outcomes in the cases that come before us.
As Justice Cardozo recognized, "We may try to see things as
objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with
any eyes except our own." We do have the law to guide us, but more
is required, in terms of 6ur own self-awareness:
Much of the law is designed to avoid the necessity for the judge
to reach what Holmes called his 'can't helps,' his ultimate
convictions or values. The force of precedent, the close
4 Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 750 (1970),
quoted in ALDISERT, supra, note 36, at 2-14.
42Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 989
(1996), cited in Larkin, supra, note 26, at 4.
43See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987), for a discussion of unconscious
discrimination in the context of the requirement of proving a racially discriminatory purpose
in constitutional challenges to facially neutral laws. Referring to "the multitude of parochial
self-interests the unconscious seeks to disguise and shield," Professor Lawrence, of Stanford
Law School, argues that "judicial exploration of the cultural meaning of governmental actions
with racially discriminatory impact is the best way to discover the unconscious racism of
governmental actors." Id. at 387-388.
"CADozo, supra note 40, at 13. See also Durham, supra note 35.
XVII Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 26
applicability of statute law, the separation of powers, legal
preemptions, statutes of limitations, rules of pleading and
evidence, and above all the pragmatic assessments of fact that
point to one result whichever ultimate values be assumed, all
enable the judge in most cases to stop short of a resort to his
personal standards. When these prove unavailing . . . the
judge necessarily resorts to his own scheme of values. It may
therefore be said that the most important thing about a judge is
iS piUlosop y; ard ilf it bM IgrLoUU f imU1 tu h1ave one, IL la
at all events less dangerous than the self-deception of having
none.
45
If we are to be truly independent decision-makers, we must
acknowledge and address the potential effects of such underlying values
and forces. Professor Richard Pierce quotes Judge Jerome Frank on
this subject:
Interests, points of view, preferences, are the essence of living.
The conscientious judge will, as far as possible, make
himself aware of his biases . . . and, by that very self-
knowledge, nullify their effect. Much harm is done by the myth
that, merely by [becoming] a judge, a man ceases to be human
and strips himself of all predilections.. . . The concealment of
the human element in the judicial process allows that element
to operate in an exaggerated manner; the sunlight of awareness
has an antiseptic effect on prejudices.46
Judge Frank and Professor Pierce raise a valuable point: In some
ways, perhaps because of the strong need to project fairness and avoid
even the appearance of impropriety, judges may actually be more
subject to subconsciously concealing and thereby actually exaggerating
any underlying human preferences, values, and biases. Also, because
judges are regularly called upon to resolve the disputes of others, we
45Paul Freund, Social Justice and the Law, SOCIAL JUSTICE 93, 110 (R. Brandt ed.
1962), as quoted in ALDISERT, supra note 36, at 2-12.
. Pierce, supra note 7, at 519, quoting from In re J. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650,
651-53 (2d Cir. 1943).
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may develop a propensity to believe that we are called upon to use our
own personal wisdom to help others resolve their disputes, and indeed
to believe in the superiority of such personal wisdom. We may neglect
to maintain awareness of personal biases, values, and preferences, and
we may even become self-satisfied and appear to be arrogant. This
quite obviously can contribute to the sort of public outrage against
judges that we see today.
Of course, even the brightest sunlight may not be completely
effective in disclosing and eradicating prejudices and biases. As Redish
and Marshall note in their article, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, "[i]n many instances the pressures
on an adjudicator may be so subtle that not even she is aware that her
decision has been shaped by improper influences.' ' 7 It is suggested that
any judges who claim to be immune to improper influences, or to have
erased all prejudice, bias and predilections from their psyches, may
well be fooling themselves, and fall into Freund's most "dangerous"
category. Maintaining awareness of the possibility that any of us might
be, even unconsciously, affected by such forces -- both external and
internal -- would seem to be a key to being a good judge who practices
independent decision-making in the best sense of the words.
2. The Responsibility of Independent Decision-Making
The second fundamental premise of this article is that independent
decision-making should indeed be viewed less as a power than as an
indispensable responsibility of all judges, at all levels, including ALJs.
At times, in discussions of independent decision-making, some
participants, both pro and con on the issue, seem to take for granted that
the issue has to do with the level of personal power or authority an
individual in a judicial or quasi-judicial role enjoys.
This approach, while it recognizes some basic truths about human
temptation, is flawed, because the pertinent issue is not really how
much power or authority an individual in a judicial role should have for
himself or herself, but how much practical independence and authority
on the part of a decision-maker is required for effectively fair and
"' Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L. J. 455, 494 (1986).
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neutral decision-making. University of Pennsylvania Professor Stephen
B. Burbank put it thus: "As obvious as this may seem, there is a risk,
to which even federal judges may fall prey from time to time, of
reifying the concept of judicial independence and of treating it as a
disembodied goal rather than the means to higher ends."' ALJs as well
will do well to guard against falling into this logical fallacy.
True independent decision-making is based on the law and facts of
cases, 49 as independent as possible of any internal biases, external
pressures, u iforimatiOn nuot uqually Utu1sswiue L l p l LICS. Irue
independent decision-making has less to do with personal power and
the trappings thereof than it does with fulfilling the values of due
process. Indeed, true independent decision-making is not easy, and the
author would argue that it should not be taken for granted, or sought, as
a prerogative to be "enjoyed."
The difficult and even onerous nature of true independent decision-
making is perhaps best illustrated by reference to the sometimes
extreme negative consequences suffered by some federal judges in the
civil rights era of the 1960's." It may reasonably be supposed that
these judges experienced their independence less as something they
enjoyed than as something they felt a deep commitment to fulfill,
despite the shunning and more serious consequences they suffered as
a result.
Independent decision-making involves more subtle personal
sacrifice as well. As illustrated in the preceding section, it demands
paying rigorous attention to deciding cases based not on a judge's
personal beliefs and convictions on what is right or appropriate (which
might otherwise seem natural and feel "right") but on as neutral as
possible interpretation and application of the law, after hearing the
evidence and arguments of all parties, whether or not the judge agrees
with the law. It requires resisting political, personal, financial and other
forms of pressure at a level not expected of non-judges. It involves
"Burbank, supra note 20, at 117.
"'The principle of the exclusiveness of the record has been called "the basic principle
governing administrative hearings and decisions." Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law
Cases During 1995, 48 ADmIN. L. REV. 399,405 (1996). See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
(1970): "Finally, the decision maker's conclusion ...must rest solely on the legal rules and
evidence adduced at the hearing." Id. at 271.
"°See Kaufman, supra note 37, at 689-690.
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avoiding much of the kind of informal discussion with non-judges that
others naturally engage in about their work.
3. The Importance of Independent Decision-Making
Redish and Marshall posit that an independent adjudicator is the
necessary "floor" or core element of due process, without which the
values of due process cannot be realized, in any legal proceeding --
whether in court or in an administrative context.51 They contend that
"the one procedural protection that is clearly necessary for the
fulfillment of all the goals of due process is the participation of a truly
independent adjudicator." Stating that "the participation of an
independent adjudicator is such an essential safeguard" that the value
of due process "cannot be protected" without it, they find judicial
independence to be so basic that it may be the "only" essential
safeguard of due process.5 2 Other safeguards such as the right to notice,
hearing, counsel, etc. "are of no real value . . . if the decisionmaker
bases his findings on factors other than his assessment of the evidence
before him." 3
The concept of an independent decision-maker is therefore a
fundamental one in the American legal system, including the
administrative legal system. And although ALJs may not have the
same level of authority, power, or practical independence as judicial
branch judges, they must adhere to the same standard of impartial
decision-making. 4 Moreover, it has been held that, when procedural
safeguards available in court proceedings are not present in
administrative proceedings, the due process requirement of an impartial
decisionmaker is to be applied even more strictly than in court
proceedings.5
5
5
"Redish, supra note 47, at 456-457.521d. at 475
31d. at 476.
14See KoCH, supra note 7, §6.7[2] at 218; Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330
(9th Cir. 1987), appeal after remand 884 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1989); Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784
F. Supp. 94, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
SVentura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995). Some of the types of less
formal on-the-record administrative proceedings that exist at the federal level are described in
William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?-Using Informal Proceduresfor Imposing
Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1993). Funk addresses the agency
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To guide us in meeting this responsibility, codes of conduct for
ALJs,56 as for judicial branch judges, in many jurisdictions contain
numerous requirements conceived to protect and ensure our
independence. These range from limitations on financial and political
activities, to rules on conflicts of interest and disqualification, to the ex
parte prohibitions, which exist to ensure that decisions are made based
solely on the record and the law and not on any outside influences or
information, to the broad imperative to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety.
Any management and/or evaluation program for ALJs must be very
carefully crafted and implemented in light of these requirements, which
can assist us in becoming the judges we should be. That we need help
and guidance in this regard can hardly be disputed. For human beings
are not computers able to exclude completely from consideration
specified factors, but (notwithstanding some theoretical few bastions of
strength among us) are at bottom fallible creatures, affected by
pressures tremendous and small, especially when they are perceived --
consciously or unconsciously -- as constituting any sort of threat to life,
limb, or happiness. And as Professor Rosenblum has observed, in the
context of performance evaluation, "People's livelihoods are enhanced
or decimated depending upon whether supervisors check 'good' or
'poor' on a standardized evaluation form."57
motivations for desiring such informal procedures -- both legitimate cost, time, and case
management considerations, as well as the more covert control motive to win cases more
easily, Id. at 67-68; notes the erosion of the intended broad applicability of the federal APA
and uniformity of procedures under the Act; and suggests that if informal procedures are to be
used, the APA should be amended in order to provide more appropriate uniformity in such
proceedings. Id. at 66-69. Professor Funk also observes that "the lack of assured neutrality
of the Presiding Officer [in such less formal proceedings] must be addressed," and suggests
that those who hear such cases, whether they be ALJs or "presiding officers," should be better
insulated "from both the reality and appearance of enforcement oversight and influence,"
through such means as "making the job fulltime and not having the Presiding Officer rated by
persons in the enforcement office ...... Id. at 61.
36 See note 109, infra.
" Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 1. Although the focus of this article is not on how
aspects of evaluation systems in the judicial branch of government may potentially compromise
judicial independence, it is interesting to note that Rosenblum goes on, immediately after the
language quoted in the text, to state that "Bar associations influence the makeup of our
judiciary by releasing results of evaluative bar polls just prior to elections." Id.
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C. Management Principles
1. Finding an Appropriate Balance: Maintaining Independence
and Standards of Performance
Professor Rosenblum's observation illustrates the dangers that are
inherent in evaluating administrative law judges. If livelihoods can be
"decimated" by negative evaluations, simple principles of human nature
would suggest that people being evaluated on their work performance
will tend to try to do what is necessary to obtain more rather than less
positive marks on such evaluations. As noted by Redish and Marshall,
quoting Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers, "[i]n the general
course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to
a power over his will."58
Such power may not always exert itself on a conscious level. If
judges are subject to internal influences and motivations of which they
may not be very aware, and to "forces which they do not recognize"
tugging at them and affecting their decisions,59 it is likely that they, like
others who are evaluated, may well on some level of consciousness try
to do what is necessary to obtain more rather than less positive
evaluations, even when they would otherwise act differently, all other
things being equal. This may be appropriate, when the changes in
behavior are in accordance with the law and what is generally agreed
to constitute good judging. However, other changes in behavior may
occur as well, which may not be so justifiable.
As Hamilton suggested, inappropriate changes in behavior may be
most likely when the results of evaluations can have any effect on
judges' livelihoods. The use of evaluations in judicial systems in which
judges are elected can obviously affect re-election chances. For
administrative law judges in many jurisdictions, evaluations are directly
tied to "merit pay" increases or "pay for performance." In addition,
evaluations may affect order of layoff in a reduction in force." Finally,
' Redish, supra, note 47 at 481, quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 583 (Alexander
Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937) (emphasis in original).
39CARDozo, supra note 40, at 12-13. See also text accompanying notes 40-47.
"See, e.g., TENNESSEE CODE ANN. §8-30-320(a)(2), which allows performance
ratings to be considered in determining order of layoffs "when the seniority calculations
produce an order of layoff difference of less than one (1) year."
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to the degree evaluations are public, they can affect a judge's
reputation, and thereby his or her future career. Given such realities, it
is possible that acting in such a way to improve one's chances of
receiving good evaluations may well at times include acting in a less
rather than more fair, efficient and otherwise legally appropriate
manner.
In a perfect world, there might be a perfect evaluation system in
which perfect human beings would evaluate other human beings,
~ a~m~n;~t la;i 1ox ApAc ,miivpii on% fth, h)aeio fnw -Vamnlp
of how fairly and efficiently -- according to perfectly-defined standards
of fairness and efficiency -- those evaluated have performed their
duties. And those evaluated would have no motivation other than to
become more fair and more efficient. However, we do not live in a
perfect world, and we must consider such realities as the limitations of
human intelligence, "human nature," deep-seated biases and prejudices
-- both obvious and subtle, blatant and unacknowledged -- and the
tendency to respond to perceived threats to one's well-being, even
against one's better judgment.
The question becomes: How should any standards setting and
enforcement in an adjudicatory system be structured, from a legal and
management standpoint, so as to minimize inappropriate responses,
maximize fairness and neutrality in decision-making, and best assure
that appropriate standards of competence and conduct are maintained?
There is, of course, an inherent tension between the concept of
independent decision-making and maintaining standards of competence
and conduct, if anyone other than the individual decision-maker is to
participate in the latter. With complete independence, there would be
no outside participation in setting or enforcing any standards of conduct
or competence and, except for the corrective and possibly restraining
effects of the appellate process, an incompetent judge who engaged in
improper conduct would have free rein to inflict harm on parties, and
on the system. On the other hand, if inappropriate standards are set, or
enforcement is biased, too heavy-handed, or otherwise compromised by
inappropriate factors or procedures, independent decision-making and
fairness to parties and the system may suffer.
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An appropriate balance must be found: if fair, impartial, well-
reasoned, and timely decisions are the desired outcome, an adjudicative
system should be organized to foster as much practical independence
as possible on the part of the decision-makers, while at the same time
ensuring that appropriate standards are set and enforced, in an
appropriate manner. To preserve the integrity of such a system, the job
of judge should be structured so as to make fulfilling the responsibility
of making fair, impartial, well-reasoned, and timely decisions as easy
as possible, and not more difficult. If there is to be any evaluation of
judges, it should be done in such a way to facilitate rather than hinder
judges in fulfilling the responsibility of independent decision-making.
To this end, management principles that promote the values of the
American legal system and independent decision-making should guide
the management of administrative adjudicative systems, including any
evaluation, broadly defined as any standards-setting and enforcement,
in regard to ALJs.
2. Modem Management Thinking
The fact that most ALJs are hired rather than appointed for a term
or elected, and are considered to be "employees" in a government
bureaucracy, has led to the use of management-by-objectives
approaches with regard to many ALJs. However, according to several
management experts who have raised some provocative and compelling
questions about some previously little-questioned assumptions,
traditional management by objectives and traditional periodic
performance evaluation systems, although deeply ingrained in
American management philosophy, may not serve us well, especially
with regard to work that is difficult to quantify objectively and that
requires independent thought and decision-making. According to the
theories of these experts, traditional performance evaluation systems are
inherently subjective exercises and can actually diminish effective
performance in any work setting. Professor Canice Prendergast of the
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business has illustrated how
such evaluation systems and other ranking mechanisms tend to create
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"yes" men (and women),6 and are subject to discrimination and bias
that is difficult to monitor.62
Prendergast observes that in real-world employment relations,
"[s]upervisors use subjective information to evaluate subordinates'
performance and to allocate rewards, but supervisors are not themselves
the residual claimants of subordinates' output. This leaves room for
supervisors' preferences, and biases, to affect rewards by manipulating
the appraisal system."6' 3 Prendergast notes a 1985 survey, which
established that supervisors give higher ratings to subordinates of their
own race -- the race of both the raters and the ratees affected
evaluations." It has also been shown that, in judicial evaluation
programs, women judges endure consistently stronger criticism than
their male colleagues, especially in particularly subjective categories
such as demeanor. Those women judges who score high in the areas of
legal knowledge, promptness, and case management are subjected to
"condescending barbs" and "often receive low marks for strong and
decisive action, behavior that garners praise for their male
colleagues. '
Whether such bias is intentional or unconscious, the effects remain
the same, and obviously compromise the integrity of evaluation
systems. And sometimes, clear favoritism may be at work. For
example, Prendergast cites research illustrating the political aspects of
performance appraisal, giving an example in which Navy supervisors
were found to evaluate favored subordinates so as to maximize the
likelihood of their promotion.66
Bias can cause inefficiencies on a number of dimensions:
Prendergast notes that "[e]mployees who feel discriminated against
may quit, with resulting turnover costs and lost human capital for the
organization." ' 7 Discouraged effort among those who conclude that
6 1Canice Prendergast, A Theory of "Yes Men," 83 AM. ECON. REV. 757 (1993).
62Canice Prendergast & Robert Topel, Discretion and Bias in Performance
Evaluation, 37 EuR. ECON. REV. 355 (1993).
631d. at 356.
"Id. at 358.
'Unfinished Business: Overcoming the Sisyphus Factor, A Report on the Status of
Women in the Legal Profession, ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, at 17 (1995).
"Prendergast, supra note 62 at 358.6 ld. at 359.
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they are out of the running for rewards can offset any encouragement
of the front-runners.6" Bias "makes it difficult to distinguish genuinely
good performance from favoritism."69 Incentives for effort are actually
reduced by such bias, according to Prendergast, both in the favored and
the unfavored, by lowering morale and thereby leading to lower effort
and output overall. It also leads to interpersonal "influence activities"
and subtle forms of bargaining, or "rent-seeking," with superiors."0
Monitoring bias is difficult, according to Prendergast, because
supervisors have an information advantage. Also, supervisors have
control over many decisions that affect subordinates' productivity --
through assignments, provision of training, informing them of
opportunities, etc. Monitoring can raise the possibility "that
supervisors will 'sabotage' the performance of workers in order to
justify their biased ratings." And subjects of evaluation often fear
reprisals from supervisors if they report them for unfair treatment.
Empirical work cited by Prendergast shows that management is
reluctant to reverse decisions made by lower-level supervisors, not
wanting the supervisors to "lose face," or to suffer "the negative
externality caused by decision reversal on future effort incentives" by
workers who lose trust in the reversed supervisor. For all these reasons,
according to Prendergast, the exercise of favoritism is extremely
difficult to constrain."'
Prendergast concludes that subjectivity is central to performance
appraisal in most organizations, and that bias in evaluations can give
rise to inefficiencies, not only by negatively affecting the performance
of workers, but also by making it difficult to determine the true talents
of workers.72
An additional aspect of the problem of bias and favoritism is that
supervisors have been shown to distort their evaluations more when
their decisions substantially affect subordinates' welfare. Also,
favoritism generates value for supervisors, and leads naturally to a
demand for "power" by those in authority, according to Prendergast and
"Id. at 362.
"Id. at 359.701d.
71ld. at 360-361.
72d. at 364.
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Topel in a more recent paper on favoritism in organizations." Noting
that the economics literature in the past has generally ignored issues
such as personal preferences toward employees and the demand for
power by management,74 Prendergast and Topel provide valuable
analysis in understanding the subjective nature of performance
evaluations.
In his "theory of yes men," Prendergast points out that "when the
point of reference for adequate performance is the manager's opinion,
an endogenous desire arises for the worker to conform to the opinion of
the manager. This arises because the only way to induce the worker to
exert effort is by comparing the findings of the manager with those of
the worker. Hence subjective performance evaluation gives rise to the
existence of 'yes men,' who attempt to second-guess the opinions of
their monitor and mimic them. 75
This goes further, and leads to a desire for conformity, with workers
reporting and acting not just on the basis of their own observations, but
also on what they believe the opinions of others to be. "Hence
interaction stifles 'creativity,' as all workers converge inefficiently to
a similar conclusion." Prendergast compares his conclusions to other
'Canice Prendergast & Robert H. Topel, Favoritism in Organizations, 104 J. POL.
ECON. 958, 959 (1996).
74 M8 at 975. Prendergast and Topel observe that "bribery and lobbying [addressed
by other studies] are unnecessary to illustrate the [issue], all that is necessary is that supervisors
have likes and dislikes toward their subordinates." Further, they posit two additional
inefficiencies, notwithstanding the benefits -- to supervisors -- of greater authority: increased
risk on workers and more inefficient task assignments. Id. at 976.
Another study by Prendergast (with Lars Stole) has to do with the manner in which
decision-makers approach new information when decisions reflect on people's ability to learn.
Although their study was done in the context of a manager making investment decisions over
time, some of their findings may have relevance in an evaluation context. Prendergast and
Stole identify two possible distortions in responses to new information, which arise from a
wish to acquire a reputation as quick learners, and which coincide with the theories of social
psychologists: first, exaggerated over-responses at the early stages of receiving new
information, which corresponds to the "base rate fallacy or overconfidence effect" of social
psychology; and later, conservatism, corresponding to the concepts of "cognitive dissonance
reduction" and the "sunk cost fallacy," in which individuals commit more resources to a losing
cause so as to justify or rationalize their previous behavior. If such responses come into play
in evaluation situations, in which it may be said that there may be some incentive for acquiring
a reputation for learning, then the actual value of evaluation programs may obviously be less
than predicted. Canice Prendergast & Lars Stole, Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-
Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning, 104 J. PoL. ECON 1105, 1106, 1125 (1996).
"Prendergast, supra note 61, at 758.
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literature in the field of management, on principal-agency relationships,
and on "herding" and conformity. 76 He concludes that "yes" men are
likely to be concentrated among the less able workers, among workers
with less able managers, in organizations with much interaction
between management and workers, and in organizations with "high-
powered incentives." 77 However, he notes "one key point that must be
stressed:"
I have not assumed that workers wish to mimic their
supervisors per se. Instead, this arises endogenously as the only
way to induce the worker to exert effort so that the existence of
yes men is a natural implication of subjective performance
evaluation.78
Peter Block, a management expert and consultant, has also observed
the "fundamentally subjective" nature of performance evaluations,
suggesting that, "[g]iven the subjective nature of evaluations, we are as
likely to be rating and paying people for compliance as we are for
performance. 79 More bluntly, Block terms appraisal "a process of
coercion." Noting that "[w]e also call it a reward system. Yet if it is a
reward system, it is a punishment system too."' He asserts that "[i]f
the intent of the appraisal is learning, it is not going to happen when the
context of the dialogue is evaluation and judgment." Acknowledging
that the appraisal process is a "tough one to let go," Block advocates
self-evaluation, evaluation by "customers" rather than by bosses, and
less formal means of feedback."
One of the earliest thinkers in the field of management who raised
questions about performance evaluations was W. Edwards Deming,
who in the period after World War II worked with Japanese
corporations, teaching them how to be productive and maintain quality.
Deming has asserted that management by objectives, the prevailing
61d. at 759; (citations omitted).
77d. at 769-770.7S1d. at 763.
79PETER BLOCK, STEWARDSHIP -- CHOOSING SERVICE OVER SELF-INTEREST, 172
(1993).
801d. at 199.
"Id. at 152-154.
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theory of which performance evaluation is a part, and ranking
employees, is "devastating" to true productivity, and should more
accurately be called "management by fear." According to Deming,
such a system nourishes short term performance, at the expense of
effective long term planning. It also "builds fear, demolishes
teamwork, nourishes rivalry and politics [and] leaves people bitter,
crushed, bruised, battered, desolate, despondent, dejected, feeling
inferior, some even depressed, unfit for work for weeks after receipt of
rating, unable to comprehend why they are considered to be inferior."
Further, it is "unfair, in that it ascribes to the people in a group
differences that may be caused totally by the system that they work
in.,,92
Observing that people who are evaluated "are afraid to ask
questions that might indicate any possible doubt about the boss's ideas
and decisions, or about his logic," Deming suggested that "[t]he game
becomes one of politics. Keep on the good side of the boss. Anyone
that presents another point of view or asks questions runs the risk of
being called disloyal, not a team player, trying to push himself ahead."
In the same vein as Prendergast, Deming noted the pressure to "[b]e a
yes man," and concluded that fair rating is impossible. 3
Deming also found the setting of numerical goals and quotas to be
non-productive, because they can lead to distortion and faking. One
example he gave was that of a federal mediator who was rated on the
number of meetings he conducted during the year; the mediator had
improved his rating by stretching out to three meetings negotiations
between parties when he could have settled all the problems in one
meeting." Other examples can easily be posited: ALJs evaluated on
numbers of cases completed taking less time than appropriate to
consider evidence and analyze it is light of relevant law, being more
likely to hold parties in default and dismiss (and thereby complete)
cases when it may not be clear the parties received notice of a hearing, 5
'
2W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRISIS, 102.( 1982)31d. at 108-109.
"Id. at 106.
Ul'his example was given by one of the presenters at a seminar presented by the ABA
National Conference of Administrative Law Judges held October 12, 1996, in Chicago, on the
subject, "Surviving the Pressure Cooker: A Workshop to Help Judges Maintain the Balance
Between Agency Objectives and Judicial Independence."
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etc.
Deming advocated the abolishment of all ranking and other barriers
to taking pride in one's work; the encouragement of communication
and continual learning; the study and management of systems, to
improve processes; and analysis of the distinction between common
causes of variation and special causes, in order to better understand the
kinds of action to take. He espoused cooperation rather than
competition among workers, improving systems rather than targeting
perceived faults in workers, and avoiding reliance on extrinsic
motivation in favor of intrinsic motivation, self-esteem, and dignity.
He believed that such a transformation of leadership concepts would
result in higher quality and productivity in the workplace.'
3. The Relevance of Modem Management Thinking to
Considerations of Accountability
Some of the characterizations of performance evaluations
summarized above may sound extreme to those who believe strongly
in performance evaluation as a means of maintaining accountability
with the public. However, accountability to the public is a somewhat
slippery concept in this day and age, in contexts in which issues are not
easily definable in short sound bites. Care must be taken to be sure that
what is desired is not merely the appearance of accountability, to calm
a restless and angry (and voting) public.
True accountability in the context of a judicial system, including an
administrative judicial system, should include above all assuring the
public that proceedings are fair. It should also include assuring the
public that proceedings are conducted in a timely manner, and
efficiently, but not at the expense of fairness or depriving parties of
their right to be heard. It should include assuring the public that those
who serve as judges are qualified, and that if there are problems with a
judge's performance that arise to a level of significance generally
agreed, in an appropriate context, to constitute an appropriate basis for
removal, those problems will be corrected or the judge will be removed.
Finally, in order to achieve these other goals of accountability, it should
86W. Edwards Deming, Leadership for Quality, 11 EXEC. EXCELL. 3-5 (1994)
(published after Deming's death in December 1993).
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include public education on how various parts of the legal system
work."' Only with such education will the public likely come to
understand and support the concept ofjudicial independence.
Judicial performance evaluation systems have been and will
continue to be adopted, to address public concern over judicial
accountability. However, to ignore the knowledge of experts in the
field of management on the subject of performance evaluation, a
process that was developed in the field of management, would seem to
be foolhardy. Moreover, surveys have shown that most persons who
participate in evaluations, both supervisors and employees, "rate the
process a resounding failure," according to a November 1996 Wall
Street Journal article. Citing studies concluding that up to 90 percent
or more of performance evaluation systems used by business are
unsuccessful, the article listed as reasons for this that the process is
often "just a ritual," that systems are poorly designed, that supervisors
dislike confrontation and employees often react negatively (noting one
incident in which a worker killed four of his bosses after receiving a
poor review), and that the process is simply ineffective at improving
performance. Problems in multi-rater review systems -- which include
evaluation by peers, subordinates and customers in addition to
supervisors -- were also identified: Such systems "often become a
popularity contest" and "produce rabid politics and widespread
dissatisfaction."8 9
See supra. note 17.
s Timothy D. Schellhardt, Annual Agony, WALL ST. J. November 19, 1996, at Al.
99 Id. at A10. Alternatives to traditional evaluation that are discussed in the article
include more frequent reviews, and giving up forms altogether in favor of teaching everyone
how to give and receive good feedback. Id. Another alternative might be to take performance
evaluation to its logical end, which might be something like one extremely rigorous form
practiced by a major oil company. The company is organized into a hierarchy of various levels
of supervisors, with each supervisor responsible for annually evaluating approximately 10
persons who work under him or her. Everyone at all levels is subject to this process. Each
supervisor must rate his or her supervisees in order of rank, according to how well each
supervisee is seen to be producing. Then, groups of approximately 10 supervisors at each level
meet, and merge their separately-ranked lists into combined ranked lists of some 100
employees each. This is done through a process of comparison of the supervisors' experiences
with the various supervisees; disagreement and open discussion is encouraged, in order to
reach accurate determinations, and efforts are made to take relevant variables into account so
as to reach fair decisions on ranking. If one supervisor has little success with a particular
supervisee, that employee will be placed under another supervisor for a period of time to
determine whether he or she might be more productive under someone else. Persons who end
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Given these dangers, and given that a significant problem identified
by the management experts is that performance evaluation systems
compromise independent thinking, the judicial community would do
well to attend to the information these experts have to offer, if a system
with true accountability and integrity is the goal. While judges are
subject to numerous requirements intended to preserve independence,
pressures from the public are becoming more insistent, with the
potential for having real impacts in judges' lives, which can
compromise judicial independence despite conscious efforts to avoid
such compromise. 90 It cannot be assumed that, by some magical
powers, judges above all other human beings will resist all pressures
that might affect their jobs and their livelihoods. Therefore, to adopt
well-intended programs that nonetheless may have the potential to add
to these pressures would not appear to be wise.
The question, again, is: how should any standards setting and
enforcement in an adjudicatory system be structured, from a legal and
management standpoint, so as to minimize inappropriate responses,
maximize fairness and neutrality in decision-making, and best assure
that appropriate standards of competence and conduct are maintained?
And further, are there any unique qualities about administrative law
judge offices that would suggest approaching this issue any differently
in such offices? Before addressing these questions, it is appropriate to
examine the traditional model for evaluation of many ALJs in light of
the three premises discussed above, and in light of what we can learn
from the management experts. This examination will start with a
consideration of the intended purposes of traditional performance
evaluation, and then move to an analysis of some of the unintended
consequences of implementing a traditional model with ALJs.
up in the bottom five to ten percent of the merged lists more than two times are terminated
from employment. In this manner, those determined to be the least able and productive, by a
number of supervisors over time, are screened out, and those perceived to be the most able and
productive are promoted. March 30, 1997, personal interview with current employee of major
oil company.
9°See supra, text accompanying notes 4047, 57.
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III. Intended Purposes and Unintended Consequences of Traditional
ALJ Evaluation Systems
A. Purposes of Performance Evaluation
The purposes of performance evaluation systems are generally good
and well-intentioned, and include such things as productivity,
efficiency, and quality and consistency of work product.9' Without
question, the image of an incompetent, lazy, biased, and/or unethical
government worker or official at any level, including judges and ALJs,
is an abhorrent one, and indeed is probably more abhorrent to
committed public servants that it is to the public at large. Such persons
make the rest of us look bad, by association. Quality, productivity,
efficiency, and fairness are not simply desirable outcomes; they are
necessary, and they apply with equal if not greater consequence in
judicial systems, including administrative judicial systems.
Performance evaluation is seen and promoted as an effective means
of achieving these worthy and important ends. By giving those who are
evaluated notice of expected performance and feedback on how well
they are performing, performance evaluation is designed to produce
improved performance in the majority of those evaluated, and to
identify individuals who either need special assistance to meet
appropriate performance standards, or must be expelled from the work
force in order to maintain its quality and integrity, according to
supporters of evaluation. Whether and how well traditional
performance evaluation programs achieve these ends is open to
question, however, from a management standpoint, as the previous
section of this article illustrates. The next section discusses some of the
ways in which there may be unintended negative consequences in
applying a traditional performance evaluation model in an
administrative judicial context, from a combined legal and
management standpoint.
9 1See supra notes 5-8, and accompanying text.
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B. Unintended Consequences of Traditional Performance
Evaluation
No matter how well-intentioned their purposes, the unintended
negative consequences of traditional evaluation systems -- in which
ALJs are ranked and in which pay and job security may be affected by
evaluation scores -- can sometimes be serious, and can rise to a level
that their negative effects outweigh any good that may be achieved
through their use. Such negative effects can include compromised
independence in decision-making, lowered morale and quality of work,
and decreased efficiency and productivity.
1. Compromised Independence
The primary, central, and critical negative consequence of
evaluation of ALJs is, quite simply, the very real potential for
influencing ALJs to rule in accordance with what is perceived to be
likely to bring about good evaluations and thereby to protect their
present and future job security, even when rulings based solely on the
facts and law of cases would reach different results. While this may not
happen in such a blatant manner as the example given in a Dilbert
cartoon, in which the boss evaluated his employees on the basis of how
many boxes of Girl Scout cookies they bought from his daughter, it can
happen, on many levels.
When such compromised independence in decision-making occurs,
it does not necessarily occur through direct attempts to influence
outcomes. It will, in fact, generally occur in more subtle ways: For
example, an ALJ knows the chief judge -- or some other evaluator --
strongly holds a particular position on a legal issue and feels that
anyone who disagrees is wrong; the ALJ disagrees, has a good legal
rationale to back up his or her viewpoint, and rules in the way he or she
interprets the law when the issue comes up in a proceeding; the
evaluator may be tempted to mark the ALJ down in a category such as
"Applies law to facts appropriately," and may do so.
Another possible example of undue influence that can manifest
itself at evaluation time arises from the fact that most judges have
cases, more or less frequently, in which a ruling in one or another way
will be controversial, possibly have great financial and human
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consequences, and be apt to provoke strong negative reactions from
some individual or segment of the community, or from government
agency personnel. Ruling the way the law, and the conscience of the
judge, dictate, may prove costly, not only for the state or other party,
but also for the judge, and other judges and co-workers -- for example,
when budgets are under consideration and those offended by a ruling
may include some who may have influence in the budget approval or
cutting process.
A chief judge may have difficulty addressing pressure that may be
exerted, and may in turn exert pressure on judges who make such
unpopular rulings. This may manifest itself in the evaluation process,
no matter how much care is taken to prevent this from happening by,
for example, limiting categories for evaluation to ones which do not
address outcomes in cases. A category such as "maintains harmonious
relations with the public, agencies and co-workers," could, for example,
be subject to the subtle exertion of improper influence, based on the
negative reactions the judge's decision might produce, both in members
of the public and other agencies, and in the chief judge. Such things
occur, human nature being what it is, and judges not being exempt from
the basic principles of human nature. 92
As Kenneth K. Stuart, Chief Judge of the 18th Judicial District of
Colorado and a participant in a 1995 American Judicature Society panel
presentation on "Evaluating the performance of judges standing for
retention," has noted, such human reactions can occur in the judicial
branch as well. Discussing the strengths and weaknesses in Colorado's
judicial evaluation program, Judge Stuart noted several strengths in the
system, including judicial improvement and bringing into the system a
'Other examples of how independent decision-making can be compromised in subtle
ways were discussed at the 1996 Annual Meeting and Conference of the NAALJ, held in
Nashville, Tennessee, in November, 1996, in a panel discussion on the subject of "Due
Process, Ex Parte Communications, and the Tension Between Independent Decision-Making
and Administrative Concerns." (Copies of the hypothetical examples and other materials used
in this discussion on file with the NAALJ Journal at Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, and are also available from the author.)
It should be noted that such problematic situations may be improved, but are not
necessarily eliminated, in central panels of ALJs. While there is increased separation of ALJs
from agency personnel, agencies can still have an impact on budgets, for example. ALJs may
therefore be subjected to pressures from not just one agency, but many, in the absence of
appropriate structural, procedural, and budgetary protections against such pressures.
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large cross-section of people, and also noted some weaknesses:
Another area that some people may view as a strength -- others
view it as a weakness -- is that because you are getting the
feedback it does tend to temper judicial arrogance. A weakness
though, is that it can -- it's not just a philosophical concern, but
a real concern -- affect judicial independence because especially
near retention time judges become very worried about the way
the [evaluation] commission is going to react.93
9
'Transcript of panel presentation, Evaluating the Performance of Judges Standing
for Retention, 79 JUDICATURE 190, 194 (Jan.-Feb. 1996) (emphasis added).
At the 1996 meeting of the American Judicature Society, a panel discussion was held
on the subject of "What is Judicial Independence?" During this discussion, in which it was
noted that "never in recent memory has there been more discussion about judicial
independence than in the last year," an audience member offered a comment, which initiated
a short exchange of views that illustrates well some of the widely ranging views on the subject
of judicial independence:
I'm a federal judge in Detroit. I assure you that criticism of an action on
a suppression motion by the chairperson of the Senate Judiciary
Committee has a powerful effect on many federal district judges who
aspire to the court of appeals. Federal judges at the district court level,
particularly younger ones, aspire to the court of appeals, and they know
their votes are being watched, their decisions are being analyzed. Young
judges on the courts of appeals aspire to the Supreme Court of the United
States. And I assure you, they think their votes are being watched. Now
whether that's good or bad in terms of judicial independence, I can't tell
you. But it's simply a fact of life. Everybody wants to be loved.
Id. Panel moderator Erwin Chemerinsky, Legion Lex Professor at University of Southern
California Law Center, responded, "Why believe that is bad rather than good? When we know
we're being watched, maybe we're more careful." This prompted panel member Kenneth C.
Jenne II, Florida State Democratic leader, to state:
To me, the judge's comment is the most frightening commentary on
appointed judges if this ambition is so overwhelming that they are going
to orient their decisions and actions to please one or two people. I thought
a judge was an individual who was not faint-hearted. My intellectual
description of ajudge is someone with backbone and courage who's going
to do the right thing. When he or she takes an oath of office, it is
meaningful. There has to be a certain amount of courage in public office,
and if one's ambition is thwarted because of a ruling, I think that
individual would make a poor judge to begin with. My concept of whom
I want to appear before is not a faint-hearted judge who's going to be
afraid to rule. I would hope every federal judge would answer like Judge
[William M.] Hoeveler [U. S. District Court Judge for the Southern
District of Florida], that they pay attention to criticism and then they do
what they want to do.
Edited transcript, 80 JUDICATURE 73, 81 (Sept.-Oct. 1996).
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Judge Stuart gave another example of how unsubstantiated
complaints that make their way into the evaluation process can affect
judges, describing a criticism leveled at a judge that he had exhibited
gender bias, with no statistical evidence to prove it and no way for the
judge to respond, because the input received by the evaluation
commission was confidential. Despite the lack of evidence, and what
"the judges feel to a certain extent [to be] a lack of process," the judge
in question lost his retention election, and "[t]he general sense [was]
that that one criticism cost him the election."'
Judge Stuart also described the way in which other forms of public
perceptions and subtle pressures can influence evaluations of judges in
the judicial branch, describing what he termed the "first weakness" of
the system:
There's a public perception of government inefficiency and
bureaucracy that spreads over to the judiciary, and there is some
pressure on commissions to buy into that feeding frenzy and
recommend against a particular judge. If you are always saying
good things about judges and always recommending them for
retention, in the eyes of the public your credibility goes down.
So, there's a sense among the commissions informally (no one
would say this publicly) that there have not been enough
negative recommendations. This, obviously, is of great concern
to judges.95
Going on to describe information he had received from a statistician
who was analyzing questionnaire results, to the effect that juror
questionnaires were unanimously favorable to judges, Judge Stuart
noted that the juror results were discounted because they were all
'See transcript of 1995 panel presentation, supra note 93, at 195.
9 Id. at 193 (emphasis added). See also Jean Tirole, Collusion and the Theory of
Organizations, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC TlIEORY: SIXM WORLD CONGRESS vol. 2 at 151,
(Jean-Jacques Laffont ed. 1992). Analyzing the phenomenon of collusion in groups, Tirole
notes that "behavior is often best predicted by the analysis of group as well as individual
incentives," and shows that "incentive structures must account for the possibility that members
collude to manipulate their functioning."
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positive.9
6
If such questions can be raised when evaluations ofjudicial branch
judges are performed by commissions, which are generally made up of
groups of persons appointed because they are highly respected in the
legal community, is not the possibility of such subtle compromising of
the process even more likely to arise when there is but a single
evaluator, or one primary evaluator? Certainly, while a "herd" instinct
may arise in groups, it is likely that individual action, not so exposed
to the view of others, may be even more easily corrupted by
inappropriate influences.
It should be recognized that, while inappropriate influence and
coercion in evaluations may be conscious and blatant, they are more
likely to be subtle, and possibly semi-conscious or unconscious. Both
evaluators and those evaluated partake of such common human
imperfections as limited awareness of differences, unacknowledged
and/or unconscious biases and prejudices,' and inconsistent moods that
may affect perceptions, actions, and decision-making. Separately or
combined, these kinds of factors can lead to inappropriate influence,
and compromise decision-making independence.
When this occurs, and when there are pronounced discrepancies
between what is likely to bring about good evaluations, and what
actually constitutes appropriate performance and decision-making
based on the facts and law of cases, the integrity of the administrative
adjudicative system is seriously compromised. Even minimal and
subtle compromise of this sort renders due process more a sham than
a reality; and a sham may be said to be worse than an outright, blatant
compromise of principle: because it looks real, it deceives and lulls
into a sense of false security.9
This danger must not be ignored, if real fairness and neutrality are
to be desired and achieved on a consistent basis, rather than randomly,
'Transcript of 1995 panel presentation, supra note 93, at 193. At another point in
the discussion, Judge Stuart and Michael D. Zimmerman, chief justice of the Utah Supreme
Court, observed that judicial temperament and demeanor, and "arbitrary setting of dates,
decision-making -- that sort of thing" led to more negative evaluations than other
characteristics such as legal knowledge and ability. Id. at 197.
" See supra, text accompanying notes 40-47 and 61-86.
9
"As Redish and Marshall observe, "It is dangerous to create an illusion of
predictability when the decision was in fact reached on the basis of irrational factors." Redish,
supra note 47 at 486.
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by the mere happenstance of whether in any given case there is some
pressure, invisible to one or more parties in the case, influencing the
ALJ to make rulings differently than she or he would rule based solely
on the facts and law of the case.9 All of the examples given above
could obviously intimidate judges into ruling in ways that are likely to
elicit more positive responses from evaluators, especially in
controversial cases, and especially in cases in which the facts and the
law are fairly evenly balanced and the ruling could go either way --
why not choose the easy way, when the stakes are so high from a
personal standpoint (in which one's career could be, if not "decimated,"
then at least negatively affected)?
In such situations judges must take special care not to lean either
way in response to such perceived pressure, and this may take courage,
and some amount of struggle to find the right way to proceed under the
responsibility of true independent decision-making. And yet, as
Professor Burbank reminds us, we should not "increase the number of
occasions when personal courage is necessary,"'"0 through, for example,
management and evaluation practices in an office.
Doing so may have broader impact than might be expected, because
the potential for inappropriate influence extends beyond the evaluated
judge who has a difficult decision to make. Other judges who observe
negative consequences for ajudge in a difficult position who acts with
courage may be even more intimidated when they find themselves in a
difficult position, and if the first judge takes the easy way and thereby
avoids "punishment," or is even rewarded, others may become more
likely to follow suit. An office or judicial system can be infected with
the subtle virus of trying to please, and the threat of public
disapprobation will make it "extremely difficult" to go against the
prevailing winds."0 '
As Princeton Professor B. Douglas Bernheim has recognized,
"[w]hen status is sufficiently important relative to intrinsic utility, many
"As Judge Larkin observes, "No judge's individual decision should be foreordained
because of hidden pressures or unarticulated premises." Larkin, supra, note 26, at 5.
"CBurbank, supra note 20, at 120.
'°In Judge Larkin's words, "[t]he more ominous threats to judicial independence are
more subtle, stealthy, and subliminal. They involve forces that operate on individual judges
as well as entire court systems. Sometimes these influences are overt. More often they are
silent and secretive, but no less telling." Larkin, supra, note 26, at 7. See also note 18, supra.
individuals conform to a single, homogeneous standard of behavior,
despite heterogeneous underlying preferences. They are willing to
conform because they recognize that even small departures from the
social norm will seriously impair their status."' 0 2
Those who believe judges are immune from such pressures to
conform may be wearing blinders unaware. That such a phenomenon
can occur without being acknowledged is actually more likely than that
it would be acknowledged, in a sense. As illustrated by any number of
recent situations in which public figures have gotten into trouble for
doing what had always previously been accepted on such a "see-no-
evil" basis (political campaign financing is but one example)
inappropriate activity can occur on a broad, generally accepted, but
unspoken-of, basis. While judges may be above some of this by virtue
of the countervailing pressure to comply with the Code of Judicial
Conduct, it is extremely unlikely that as a group they are completely
able to withstand pressure to conform, or "go along to get along,"
especially when it is the easier thing to do, and when not to go along
can have extreme negative personal and financial consequences, and
negatively affect one's status.
It has been said that the "greatest threat to the rule of law comes
from those judges who . . . make compromises in order to stay in
office . . .."'0' Good selection criteria and training programs in
ethics for judges can help to address this problem. However, it must be
recognized that judges are human beings, and that only by addressing
such problems from a systemic perspective will there be broadly
effective remedies for such compromise of principles. Evaluation
programs and their effects on independence must be taken into account
in such approaches.
2. Effects on Ouality. Efficiency. Morale. and Productivity
In addition to the danger of compromising independent decision-
making, other, related negative consequences of traditional evaluation
systems include: competition rather than cooperation among ALJs (for
02B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1994).
"3Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 165, 172
(Jan.-Feb. 1997).
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example, in sharing resources and helpful feedback), which in turn
causes quality of work product to suffer; the discouragement of
independent and creative thinking, which causes overall quality and
efficiency of the workplace to suffer; and lowered morale, which causes
decreases in productivity and efficiency.
Given that ethical ex parte prohibitions appropriately, but severely,
limit ajudge's freedom to talk about cases with pretty much everyone
except other judges," the importance of maintaining a healthy
"°
4Canon 3B(7) of the 1990 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT provides as
follows:
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding,
or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not
initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other
communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a
pending or impending proceeding except that:
(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications for scheduling,
administrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters or
issues on the merits are authorized, provided:
(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical
advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and
(ii). the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance
of the ex paste communication and allows an opportunity to respond.
(b) A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable
to a proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person
consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable
opportunity to respond.
(c) A judge may consult with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge
in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges.
(d) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties
and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge.
(e) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte communications when expressly
authorized by law to do so.
Commentary:
The proscription against communications concerning a
proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and
other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the
limited extent permitted.
To the extent reasonably possible, all parties or their lawyers
shall be included in communications with a judge.
Whenever presence ofa party or notice to a party is required by
Section 3B(7), it is the party's lawyer, or if the party is unrepresented the
party, who is to be present or to whom notice is to be given.
An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to
obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite the
expert to fle a brief amicus curiae.
Certain ex parte communication is approved by Section 3B(7)
to facilitate scheduling and other administrative purposes and to
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collegiality among judges in the same office cannot be gainsaid. When
this is lost, not only does lowered morale decrease efficiency and
productivity both individually and on an officewide level, accuracy may
also be lost, especially where many cases involving the same issues are
heard, and shared information about the latest appellate rulings and
statutory and regulatory amendments can be important, for example, in
order to avoid costly remands.
In addition, although the discouragement of independent and
creative thinking may have short-terms benefits such as more compliant
employees and reduced conflict on an open level, the long-term results
of such an approach will be a low-functioning workplace, of the sort
that leads to various unfortunate results, ranging from well-known jokes
about dull-witted government employees, to compromised service to
the public, including those citizens who are ill-equipped on their own
to address legal improprieties on the part ofjudges. All of us, citizens
and government workers alike, deserve better than this.
C. Human Sources of Negative Consequences and the Need for
Alternative Approaches
Common sense and anecdotal evidence illustrate how traditional
evaluation systems may have unintended negative consequences. For
accommodate emergencies. In general, however, a judge must discourage
ex parte communication and allow it only if all the criteria stated in
Section 3B(7) are clearly met. A judge must disclose to all parties all ex
parte communications described in Sections 3B(7)(a) and 3B(7)(b)
regarding a proceeding pending or impending before the judge.
A judge must not independently investigate facts in a case
and must consider only the evidence presented
A judge may request a party to submit proposed findings offact
and conclusions of law, so long as the other parties are apprised of the
request and are given an opportunity to respond to the proposed findings
and conclusions.
A judge must make reasonable efforts, including the provision
of appropriate supervision, to ensure that Section 3B(7) is not violated
through law clerks or other personnel on the judge's staff.
If communication between the trial judge and the appellate
court with respect to a proceeding is permitted a copy of any written
communication or the substance of any oral communication should be
provided to all parties.
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example, more than a few ALJs (along with employees of every type)
have observed the sense of unease that creeps into and pervades an
office at evaluation time each year, quarter, etc. It might be asked why
adult professionals who have no ostensible reason to fear evaluation
react in such a way.
Perhaps it is because they, as human beings, recognize that,
however lofty the goals and rhetoric of any system, those who
administer it are, as human beings, subject to such human failings as
inconsistent and whimsical moods, limited awareness of differences,
and even biases and prejudices, be they conscious or unconscious. It is
implicitly understood that any evaluation or ranking of ALJ
performance is essentially unilateral, not subject to the procedural
protections of the legal system, and therefore more subject to human
bias and error. Also, in this time of well-publicized government
cutbacks and "job anxiety," people are generally aware that traditional
evaluations may later be used in ways that may adversely affect their
livelihoods and careers, even without fault in the usual sense, and with
relatively little meaningful opportunity to respond effectively to the
contents of such evaluations.
Harking back again to Hamilton, and recalling what Prendergast et
al. have shown us, we can see that the negative unintended
consequences of traditional performance evaluation systems become
more serious, the less job security an ALJ enjoys, and the more his or
her financial well-being may be affected by evaluations. While many
ALJs enjoy full civil service protections and are removable only for
cause, others are removable at will, have no job security other than the
good will of their employer, and have only those protections under the
law that apply to any at-will employee. The less assurance of security
regarding discipline and removal procedures and standards, and the
more the livelihoods of ALJs are affected by evaluations, the more
important it is to address and avoid the potential negative consequences
of an evaluation system that may compromise independent decision-
making, through inadvertently pressuring ALJs to decide cases based,
however subtly, on inappropriate factors.
These are sensitive issues, because everyone likes to think that she
or he is fair, probably especially those of us involved in various forms
of adjudicating disputes for a living. However, it must be remembered
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that the real issue, in any serious discussion of evaluations and
independent decision-making, is not whether individual ALJs or
evaluators are capable of being fair, but how weaknesses in a system
can threaten to compromise even the best of us in potential worst-case
scenarios.
Traditional evaluation systems purport to improve performance, a
legitimate concern: few if any would disagree that judges should strive
to improve their level of competence in all areas of judicial
performance, or that judges who are truly incompetent and incapable of
improving their level of competence should be removed, or at least
encouraged to leave. However, fears that, without a traditional
performance evaluation system, traditionally implemented, some weak
ALJs will "fall through the cracks" and compromise quality, may be
overstated and misplaced. In the judicial branch, strict limitations on
the oversight and removal of judges have traditionally been deemed to
be a risk worth taking, based on the recognition that too much oversight
and/or too easy removal will lead to all-too-human compromising of
judicial independence, and based on the conviction that the strong
values of due process" 5 outweigh the danger that some judges will be
less than maximally competent."0
For the same reasons, concerns about competence in the
administrative judiciary may be better addressed through alternative
approaches, which are grounded not only in due process values but also
in sound management principles. Alternative approaches to structuring
and implementing standards-setting and enforcement systems for ALJs
may also better address and prevent the potential negative consequences
of traditional evaluation models.
'To paraphrase Judge Irving R. Kaufman, judicial independence is "not . . . for
the benefit of the judges, but for the benefit of the judged." Kaufman, supra note 37, at 690,
citing Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History,
36 U. Qn. L. REv. 665, 698 (1969).
'"As Kaufman observed (after suggesting that peer pressure is a "potent tool" for
addressing judicial incompetence), "Our judicial system can better survive the much discussed
but rarely existent senile or inebriate judge than it can withstand the loss of judicial
independence that would ensue if removal ofjudges could be effected by a procedure too facile
or a standard too malleable." Id. at 709, 715-716. Although Kaufman was speaking of the
federal judiciary, it is suggested that his observations apply equally to administrative law
judges, as long as the role of ALJ remains one of implementing, in a judicial model, due
process in proceedings affecting the interests of persons before them.
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IV. Proposal: Implementing Fundamental Principles in Traditional
Setting-s
The understanding that can be gained from the field of management,
on how independent thinking, efficiency, and productivity can be
compromised by traditional performance evaluation programs in any
setting, has increased relevance and urgency in legal systems, in which
the fundamental principles of due process and independent decision-
making, and the perception as well as the reality of fairness, are
especially to be valued. Alternative approaches that encourage
independent thinking and truthful, constructive communication may
more effectively improve performance, while at the same time
fostering, rather than hampering, independent decision-making, thereby
fulfilling the values of due process.
Whether such alternative approaches are arrived at through creation
"from the ground up," or, as will be the case with most ALJ offices,
through the restructuring or fine-tuning of an existing system, a careful
analysis must be made of all potential weak points, and such weak
points must be reinforced within the context of an effective overall
structure, if an optimally performing system is desired. All too often,
little attention is paid to the actual structure of a system, and heavy
reliance is placed on the abilities, fairness, and good will of the
individuals who administer it. A more carefully structured system is
more likely, however, to elicit the best from the people in it, as Deming
recognized. Conversely, a hastily or haphazardly structured system is
more likely to fail as a result of human error, failure of good will, or
lack of fortitude and clear vision.
The administrative law system is not exempt from these somewhat
self-evident principles. While ALJ decisions may be subject to more
levels of review than are judicial branch trial judge decisions, and while
ALJ rulings may take into account agency policy -- as found in
administrative rules, administrative adjudicative precedent, and official
and executive orders -- to a degree not generally found in the court
system, it should be remembered that the central function of ALJs is to
fulfill the requirements of due process. Their rulings should therefore
be based on the same time-tested principles of the American legal
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system, and made with the same responsibility to independent decision-
making, as that which should be borne by judges and others performing
judicial functions in the judicial system. And any management system
for ALJs should foster such responsibility to independent decision-
making, in order to fulfill more effectively the values of due process.
To achieve this end, an appropriate standards-setting and
enforcement program for ALJs should incorporate rigorous selection
criteria and procedures, high standards of conduct, effective continuing
education and training, appropriate and meaningful observation and
feedback for self-improvement, an effective and fair complaint system,
and clearly-defined and appropriate discipline and removal procedures.
I propose a system that:
* provides for careful evaluation of AU applicants on the front
end, based on qualifications, experience, and character;
* incorporates standards of performance from codes of judicial
conduct, with any other standards developed cautiously, with careful
attention to the need to protect independent decision-making, and with
full participation by all judges who will be affected;
* includes workable and useful methods of training, observation,
and feedback for self-improvement, which avoid any compromise of
independent decision-making as much as possible;
* assures both ease of making complaints, and fair evaluation of
complaints against ALJs who have allegedly violated appropriate
standards of conduct, or who are allegedly incompetent; and
* protects the rights of ALJs to be disciplined and removed only
in accordance with clearly defined, appropriate, and fair standards and
procedures, based on the same principles of due process and
independent decision-making that should be applied by ALJs in the
cases they hear. Any reduction-in-force procedures should also be
clearly defined and based on neutral, value-free criteria such as
seniority, with appropriate provision for any groups who may have
been historically underrepresented in an agency or ALJ office, in
accordance with relevant law.
0 7
"MThe Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency (Office of Administrative
Hearings), adopted by the American Bar Association House of Delegates at the mid-year
meeting in San Antonio on February 3, 1997, provides, at section 1-6(a)(4), that ALJs are to
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It must be recognized that the context for implementation of these
goals, whether in a newly-created system or in modifying an existing
system, will always be the real world we live in. Human organizations
do not operate in a vacuum, and the real-world setting for any
adjudicatory system must be acknowledged and analyzed, both for its
potential weak points, and for its strong points. Trouble-shooting
should be an ongoing and welcome activity, if an organization is to be
effective. In addition, strengths should be recognized and utilized, and
any temptation to shun the old and the traditional, and to glorify the
innovative and the new merely because it is new, should be strenuously
fought and overcome. Similarly, any tendency to strike a radical or
extreme pose for political reasons ("ask for more than you want to get
what you want") should be resisted, at least in the context of the actual
structuring of a system.
The structuring or restructuring of any standards-setting and
enforcement system for ALJs should, rather, be undertaken in a spirit
of moderation, constructiveness, and inclusiveness, while at the same
time subjecting all parts thereof to the strict scrutiny of whether they
foster or hamper due process, and whether they are in accordance with
be "removed, suspended, demoted, or subject to disciplinary or adverse actions, including any
action that might later influence a reduction in force, only for good cause, after notice and an
opportunity to be heard in an Administrative Procedure Act or other statutory-type hearing and
a finding of good cause by an impartial hearing officer." The Act also provides, at section 1-
6(a)(5), that ALJs are to "be subject to a reduction in force only in accordance with established,
objective civil service or merit system procedures." The words in section 1-6(a)(4), "including
any action that might later influence a reduction in force," arrived at through a compromise
between ALJs present at a February 1, 1997, meeting of the Administrative and Regulatory
Law Section of the ABA and Columbia Law Professor Peter Strauss, were intended to allow
an ALJ to receive a hearing on any action, including any evaluation or any other determination
that might influence a reduction in force, when such action is taken, rather than after the fact,
when the reduction in force actually occurs. The concern of Professor Strauss was that
managers not be held up with hearings at the time of any reduction in force. However, all
agreed that, whenever any action occurs, whether it be an evaluation or some other
determination related to performance, of a sort that might somehow be used by the manager
to decide who will be laid off in a reduction in force, the ALJ subject to such action would
have the right to a full hearing under section 1-6(a)(4) at the time of such evaluation or other
determination or action, to contest the determination(s) made in such action.
As of April, 1997, at least one state, Alaska, was considering adopting the Model Act.
House Bill 232, Twentieth Legislature - First Session, State of Alaska, introduced 4/4/97.
(Copy on file in the offices of the NAALJ Journal, at Loyola University of Chicago School of
Law.)
Spring 1997 Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges 57
sound management principles that further independent and creative
thinking, quality, efficiency, morale, and productivity.
A. Standards for Selection of Administrative Law Judges
AU selection criteria should be rigorous, and should include careful
evaluation of qualifications, experience, and character, to assure the
selection of highly-qualified, competent ALJs who have a broad
awareness of differences and are able to apply the law in a fair and
neutral manner. The procedures for such selection should be crafted to
assure fairness, and the selection of the best candidates. As noted by
Professor Burbank, inappropriate criteria for the selection of judges can
"abort" the issue of judicial independence on the front end.' °8
Independent screening panels such as are used in the selection ofjudges
in the judicial branch, and of ALJs in some states, may be used, both to
ensure quality more effectively, and to avoid inappropriate political or
other influence in the selection of ALJs, as much as possible.
B. Standards of Conduct for Administrative Law Judges
The most important standards of conduct for ALJs, as for all judges,
are those set forth in the various judicial codes of conduct, and these
should be incorporated and applied to ALJs.' Such codes should
'"'Burbank states as follows:
[T]aken to extremes, the use of criteria for appointment to the federal
bench that are tied to an individual's views on important issues of law and
social policy can fairly be seen as an attempt to abort, rather than to
predict, the issue of judicial independence. That is because true judicial
independence not only requires insulation from external forces that would
seek to influencejudicialjudgment other than through the judicial process.
It also requires insulation from those forces, external and internal, that so
constrain human judgment as to subvert the judicial process.
Burbank, supra note 20, at 120. (Emphasis in original.) The same principle would seem to
apply to the selection of ALJs.
"9It is noted that this is already done in many ALJ offices, especially central panels
of state ALJs, and that there are various model codes ofjudicial conduct for ALJs in existence,
including codes adopted by the NAALJ and the ABA National Conference of Administrative
Law Judges, and the Model Code of Conduct for Administrative Law Judges of State Central
Panels. The first two of these codes are presently under revision to incorporate appropriate
changes based on the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See, e.g., supra note 104.
XVII Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 58
make use of the most recent, well-thought-out model for judicial
conduct, the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. This code
may be adapted to the particular and unique circumstances of ALJs as
necessary, but this should be done sparingly, to assure high standards
of conduct and professionalism, and to maintain judicial independence.
All ALJs should be thoroughly trained in the ethics of being a judge, in
the subtleties and fine points of all requirements of relevant codes of
conduct, and in the need to conscientiously adhere to all such
requirements. Compliance with the judicial code of conduct should be
emphasized, and continuing education and training should be provided
in the area of ethics and appropriate judicial conduct for all judges, on
a regular basis.
This article is not intended to encompass an exhaustive study or
analysis of all possible standards of conduct that might be included in
any code of conduct, or in any necessary or possible evaluation
instruments regarding ALJs. There are a multitude of sources on
particular criteria for evaluation, including the American Bar
Association and the National Center for State Courts. In order to
protect fair and independent decision-making, reference should be made
to these in designing any evaluation standards for ALJs, rather than to
traditional models for non-judicial employees. The use of any existing
models of evaluations for ALJs should be limited to standards that
incorporate a judicial model, and that meet the test of reasonableness
from a judicial perspective. The reason for this is not to enhance the
prestige of the ALJ position, but to enhance the professionalism and
independence of ALJs, not for their benefit so much as for the benefit
of the parties who come before them (both the state and private parties).
With this said, I would offer a few considerations to take into
account in drawing up standards of conduct for ALJs. First, while it
has been suggested that overly broad and "amorphous" standards of
conduct may impinge on judicial independence, "0 overly detailed and
extensive standards of conduct for evaluation purposes may have the
same result, by in effect micro-managing judicial performance, a
The third has been formally adopted in at least one state with a central panel of ALJs,
Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. §24-30-1003(4), 1 COLO. CODE REGS § 104-2 (1994).
1 'James P. Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law
Judges, 6 W. NEW.. ENG. L. REv. 807, 828 (1984).
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function which by its very nature demands a high degree of autonomy.
While reasonable standards of performance and productivity should be
expected of ALJs, the key word in this regard is "reasonable." Such
means as minutely detailed descriptions of expected performance can
lead to lowered morale and loss of pride in one's work, and undermine
effective and independent decision-making. As indicated in the section
below on ongoing observation and feedback on judicial performance,
there are alternative methods of improving performance that are more
useful.
An example of standards that might be adapted for use with ALJs
is found in the ABA Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial
Performance. The ABA criteria include:
(1) Integrity -- avoidance of impropriety and appearance of
impropriety, freedom from bias, impartiality;
(2) Knowledge and understanding of the law -- legally sound
decisions, knowledge of substantive, procedural and evidentiary
law of the jurisdiction, proper application of judicial precedent;
(3) Communication skills -- clarity of bench rulings and other oral
communications, quality of written opinions, sensitivity to the
impact of demeanor and other non-verbal communications;
(4) Preparation, attentiveness and control over proceedings --
courtesy to all parties, willingness to allow legally interested
persons to be heard unless precluded by law;
(5) Managerial skills -- devoting appropriate time to pending
matters, discharging administrative responsibilities diligently;
(6) Punctuality -- prompt disposition of pending matters and
meeting commitments of time according to rules of court;
(7) Service to the profession -- attendance at and participation in
continuing legal education, ensuring that the court is serving the
public to the best of its ability;
(8) Effectiveness in working with other judges -- extending ideas
and opinions when on multi-judge panel, soundly critiquing
work of colleagues.'
I I'ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Judicial Performance, Guidelines for the
Evaluation of Judicial Performance, (1985), as quoted in Lubbers, supra note 6, at 608.
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Perhaps the most important principle to adhere to in defining
standards of judicial performance for evaluation purposes is that most
any standards, including those listed above, can compromise
independence if approached from a biased (consciously or
unconsciously), punitive, or threatening point of view, as illustrated in
the section of this article on unintended consequences of traditional
evaluation systems. The best approach to take in creating any
necessary evaluation standards of conduct, over and above those set
forth in relevant codes of judicial conduct, is therefore a cautious one.
Each standard that is considered for inclusion should be questioned: Is
evaluation of a judge by this standard truly necessary in order to
achieve good judicial performance? Can compliance with this standard
be accomplished more effectively by means other than evaluation?
Could this standard compromise or subvert, even minimally or subtly,
the responsibility of ALJs to decide cases independently, based solely
on the facts and law of the cases? How might this standard be used by
a weak evaluator, in a worst-case scenario, in a way that might
compromise judicial independence or performance? While perfect
answers may not be attained, it is important to ask such questions in
good faith, if an optimal program is to be designed.
The importance of the participation of those to be evaluated in
designing evaluation standards is also important, and participants
"should be given the opportunity to vent frustrations, comment, offer
suggestions, and review the work product as it takes shape. . . . If this
open approach is not adopted and maintained, the judicial performance
evaluation program may make judges [and other affected persons]
fearful, and the informal network will become active, [resulting] in
rumors and half-truths [and] institution of a less effective program
"112
The development of standards of conduct should be undertaken by
ALJs themselves, or by committees or commissions made up primarily
of attorneys and ALJs who understand the potential negative
consequences of evaluation programs to judicial independence.
Inappropriate input or influence from parties, agency personnel, or
others with case outcome-related interests should be avoided, and any
"'See Farthing-Capowich, supra note 9, at 24.
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input from such persons would best be limited to contributing
suggestions for portions of any survey instruments that may be
developed for use with groups of such persons. Simplicity,
straightfowardness, and clarity should be striven for in defining any
standards and questions for any surveys that may be used, in order to
avoid ambiguity and confusion, and to give those who will be evaluated
adequate notice of expected standards of conduct.
C. Continuing Education. Training. and Professional Development
Continuing education, training, and professional development
activities for ALJs should be provided, and attendance should be
encouraged, and mandated at an appropriate minimal level, in ethics
and all areas of skills improvement: procedural rules, judicial
demeanor and basics of conducting hearings, evidence, case
management procedures and skills, legal writing, and alternative
dispute resolution, to name just a few. Where weakness is perceived in
an ALJ's performance in a particular area, extra educational, training,
and/or professional development activities in that area should be
provided for that judge. In order to minimize costs, ALJs should be
encouraged to share their own knowledge in their areas of expertise
with each other, both informally and in formal training sessions. ALJs
should be encouraged to join professional organizations through which
additional education, training, professional development, and collegial
sharing can be obtained.
It must be recognized that, if accountability, quality, productivity,
efficiency, and fairness are to be expected of ALJs, then an investment
must be made in the administrative judiciary. Any good professional
continues to learn and keep abreast of current developments in a field
of endeavor, and good ALJs should maintain their familiarity with
current developments in the law relevant to their particular areas of
practice, along with the more general areas of ethics, professional
responsibility, and skills development. In this regard, it is important to
keep in mind a lesson learned from the field of education: Learners
who are respected and expected to do well are more likely to do well
than are students for whom teachers have lower expectations.
Continuing educational, training, and professional development
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activities should be encouraged as an enjoyable and stimulating aspect
of professionalism, rather than as an arduous requirement.
In developing a judicial education program, the principles of
experiential learning theory and learning styles developed by Professor
David A. Kolb, of Case Western Reserve University, and Patricia H.
Murrell and Charles S. Claxton, of the Leadership Institute in Judicial
Education, should be studied and applied, in order to maximize learning
and its real-world application. These include the idea that learning
occurs as a melding of two dimensions, "prehending" or taking in
information, and transforming or processing information, and the fact
that people have different styles of learning in both these dimensions:
Some people naturally prefer to take in learning based on concrete
experience, whereas others prefer abstract conceptualization. Some
people process information better by doing, others by watching and
reflecting. These preferences, in various combinations, produce four
different learning styles: "divergers," who prefer concrete and
reflective learning; "assimilators," who prefer abstract and reflective
learning; "convergers," who prefer abstract and active learning; and
"accommodators," who prefer concrete and active learning. Including
activities in all modes -- direct concrete experience, reflection on
experience, abstract conceptualization, and application of abstract
principles -- will make any learning experience more successful for
more people, including judges."'
Professional development activities may also include private
reading and research projects, and self-evaluation exercises based on
"'Information learned at condensed session on Leadership Through Judicial
Education, presented by Patricia H. Murrell, September 27, 1996, at the National Association
of Women Judges Conference in Memphis, Tennessee. See Charles S. Claxton and Patricia
H. Murrell, Education for Development: Principles and Practices in Judicial Education,
Leadership Institute in Judicial Education, JERITT Monograph Three, 1992. (Copy on file in
the offices of the NAALJ Journal, at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.) In their
monograph, Claxton and Murrell also discuss different stages of thinking - dualistic,
contextual, and integrated -- and the qualities of "highly developed judges." Id. at 38 et seq.
More information on these concepts can be obtained from Patricia H. Murrell, Center for Study
of Higher Education, Education Annex One, The University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee
38152. See also Gina L. Hale, Professionalism: A Call to Excellence, XVI J. NAALJ 5, 13
(Spring 1996), the 1995 NAALJ Fellowship paper, in which the author, citing among others
Claxton and Murrell, advocates the idea of developing "learning organizations," which
"perceive and foster learning as an integral part of the organizational culture."
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models of desired conduct or achievement that are arrived at
cooperatively with those who will be affected.
D. Ongoing Observation and Feedback on Judicial Performance
Any ongoing, regular formalized methods of observing and
providing feedback on the performance of ALJs should be carefully
considered both from a legal and a management standpoint, as
elucidated by the innovative management research and theory discussed
in this article, in order to avoid compromising the duty and
responsibility of ALJs to decide cases independently.
It should be recognized, as Professor Prendergast has pointed out,
that performance evaluation is a process by which "humans judge other
humans,"" 4 and place "value" on them as functioning members of
society. And yet, it should be acknowledged, traditional performance
evaluations violate some of the basic principles of judging in the
American legal system, in that they are essentially unilateral, they are
based largely on subjective impressions rather than evidence, and they
provide little opportunity to respond effectively. Unfortunately, efforts
to avoid subjectivity can backfire. For example, when case load and
other statistics are used in evaluations, this can lead to distortion and
compromised impartiality in decision-making," 5 and it should not be
forgotten that statistics can be manipulated and interpreted in any
number of ways, as any reasonably aware reader of the popular press
knows." 6 Finally, although most traditional evaluation forms include
a space for the evaluated employee to write a response, this will
generally not lead to any revision of the statements made in the
"
4Prendergast, supra note 62 at 355.
" See O'Keeffe, supra, note 9, at 621: . . [Elven if production standards do not
affect the substance of a case directly, they may do so indirectly through the changes they
engender in the decision-making process." See also supra, text accompanying notes 84-85.
"'Comparing numbers of cases or orders can obviously be deceptive, since cases
vary in complexity and are not easily quantified, even according to elaborate point systems.
Even in the Social Security adjudicatory system, where cases may be more similar to each
other than those in, for example, a central panel, repeated attempts to discipline and/or remove
ALJs based on low productivity statistics were overturned by the Merit Systems Protection
Board, because the "SSA's comparative statistics did not take into sufficient account the
differences among these types of cases." See Lubbers, supra note 6, at 599, and cases cited
therein.
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evaluation, and, following the logic of Prendergast's study on bias in
performance evaluation,"' many employees will avoid doing even this,
in order to avoid potentially more negative future evaluations.
The primary purpose of any evaluation that is done should be
meaningful and appropriate evaluation for self-improvement, which is
preferably confidential. Any ongoing evaluation that is done should
scrupulously avoid any inappropriate agency influence, and any ranking
or grading of ALJs should likewise be avoided or minimized, especially
if this could have any possible future effect on job security or benefits.
Where merit pay for performance has been mandated by statute,
especially careful attention should be paid to the standards and
procedures for evaluation to assure that they avoid as much as possible
any potential for inappropriate influence.
Those who do the evaluating, in any kind of system, should be
trained in the importance of minimizing, and how best to minimize, the
negative consequences described herein. Everyone involved in the
evaluation process should acknowledge openly the very real dangers of
subtle influence through evaluation, and commit to minimizing
inappropriate influence through emphasis on the importance of
maintaining judicial independence through strict adherence to the code
of judicial conduct.
Encouraging an atmosphere of collegiality can do much to mitigate
the potential negative effects of traditional performance evaluation.
Allen C. Hoberg, ALJ and Director of the North Dakota Office of
Administrative Hearings, North Dakota's central panel of ALJs,
encourages such collegiality. Judge Hoberg does performance
evaluations of ALJs, but does no ranking and indicates only satisfactory
or unsatisfactory performance in various categories. Any indication of
unsatisfactory performance must include specific comments, include a
plan for correction, and allow for employee response. Anonymous
surveys of counsel are used, but the dangers involved with them is
recognized. Peer sharing, observation and feedback, with cooperation
and development of professional collegiality, are also used, as are such
means as staff meetings that include support staff (who also give
feedback), retreats, and formal and informal training sessions. Such
17 See supra, text accompanying note 71.
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informal means are found to be more useful than "objective"
performance evaluations.""
Others, including Chief Judge Eileen S. Willett of the Industrial
Commission of Arizona, agree that ranking or grading of ALJs is
unnecessary and "subject to misinterpretation or potential misuse in the
political arena," and that evaluation should be aimed at self-
improvement. Judge Willett suggests that "[m]icromanagement of the
judicial process even in its administrative law format is a bad idea. If
your selection criteria is high and the salary is commensurate with
experience, your AM work product will usually be good. Codes of
conduct, a disciplinary process that has due process and a continuing
education program are also key to success.""' 9
Deputy Director Jeff S. Masin of the New Jersey Office of
Administrative Law, likewise agrees that "[a]ny attempt to rank judges,
or otherwise to perform some sort of 'fine-tuned' evaluation, is neither
necessary nor likely to be valid. Attempts to tie compensation to
evaluation, such as providing different rates of pay increase to judges
based upon some scale of performance, can cause serious internal strife
and are not likely to produce valid results." A previous system of
providing for different salaries arising from the evaluation process in
New Jersey was changed, to eliminate such salary differences.
20
In addition to the informal methods used, for example, by Judge
Hoberg, it may be useful to borrow from judicial branch evaluation
systems, to minimize insofar as possible the negative effects of the
unilateral and inappropriately subjective aspects of traditional
management-by-objectives performance evaluation, and to provide for
meaningful input into, and response to, evaluations by ALJs.
According to the National Center for State Courts' State Court
Organization 1993, the evaluation methods used by the states with
judicial evaluation programs include questionnaires given to lawyers,
jurors, law enforcement and probation officers, social service workers,
"Letter from Allen C. Hoberg to Ann M. Young, (Sept. 25, 1996) (copy on file
with the NAALJ Journal, at Loyola University Chicago School of Law).
"'Letter from Eileen S. Willett to Ann M. Young (Dec. 9, 1996) ( copy on file with
the NAALJ Journal at Loyola University Chicago School of Law).
'Letter from Jeff S. Masin to Ann M. Young (Oct. 31, 1996) (copy on file with
the NAALJ Journal at Loyola University Chicago School of Law).
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volunteers and others who provide information to courts, litigants, staff,
colleagues, appellate judges (for evaluation of lower court judges) and
trial court judges (for evaluation of appellate judges); interviews with
evaluated judges and others; courtroom observation; background
investigations; public hearings; assessment of sentencing practices;
analysis of case management data; and video tape records. 12 1
Although some of these approaches may not be relevant in an
administrative adjudication context, and may as well be cost-prohibitive
in offices of ALJs that are generally much smaller and less well-funded
than court systems, some might be applied appropriately, provided such
potential weaknesses as those identified by Judge Stuart (in section III-
B above), are acknowledged and minimized insofar as possible. 22 For
example, consideration might be given to including the impressions of
more persons than just one or two supervisors, to avoid inappropriate
subjectivity as much as possible. 123 However, the dangers of such
'
21See supra note 3.
'Terms like "insofar as possible," "as much as possible," etc., are used in
discussing potential problems and pitfalls in evaluation systems, not to indicate in any way that
the utmost efforts to avoid such problems should not be undertaken, but rather to acknowledge
that perfect avoidance of such problems will probably never be possible, and to note the value
of such acknowledgment. If judicial arrogance is to be avoided, and counteracted through
judicial evaluation, then the proponents and implementers of judicial evaluation programs
should likewise be aware of the danger of becoming arrogant and oversure of the benefits of
such programs.
'Rosenblum suggests the creation of evaluation panels, consisting of representatives
"from bench, bar, peer groups, and relevant sectors of academia." Rosenblum, supra, note 1,
at 88. Overseeing such panels would be an advisory committee "drawn from such realms as
retired ALJs and agency officials, current senior ALJs, federal and state court judges, private
practitioners, and professors of law and of administration noted for knowledgeability about the
administrative process." Id. Questionnaires would be sent to parties and counsel who have
appeared before evaluated ALJs, separated into pre- and post-decisional questionnaires to
minimize the possibility of bias. Id. at 76. Panels of three members each would "consider the
AL's self-assessment, the questionnaire responses, [observer] reviews of the [AL's] hearings,
and opinions of the ALI and the review of the employing agency," and from all this
information prepare a written evaluation "summarizing its findings about the particular
strengths, particular weaknesses, recommended actions and methods for improvement, and
overall quality of the AL's performance." Id. at 88. The report would ideally be discussed
with the evaluated judge, Id., and "could trigger initiation of disciplinary or removal action
against an ALJ where the uniform tenor and content of evaluations present clear and
convincing evidence that a particular ALI is less than competent." Id. at 89.
Rosenblum recognizes that there may be inconsistent approaches to evaluation by
different evaluators: "It is not beyond likelihood, for example, that some reviewers might be
favorably impressed by a judge's meticulous concern for fairness beyond the rudiments of due
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multi-rater evaluation becoming a "popularity contest" and fostering a
political atmosphere, 2 4 or being subject to conscious or unconscious
collusion,125 must be acknowledged. Such consequences are best
avoided by making programs voluntary and confidential.
To the degree any multi-rater evaluation is done, there may be
differences in how different evaluators evaluate the same behavior or
work product, as recognized by Professor Rosenblum, 2 6 but this should
be encouraged, in the context of open and meaningful communication
among evaluators where possible, and certainly between evaluators and
evaluated. It should be recognized that, within certain parameters of
reasonableness, there can be legitimate differences of opinion on how
a judge should approach particular issues or areas of performance.
After all, differing opinions are intrinsic to our legal system, as opposed
to more authoritarian forms of government and law. It should be
recognized that too-strong enforcement of too-rigid standards can lead
process requirements whereas others might view that judge's rulings as supporting and
encouraging inefficient, dilatory practices. Similarly, what some might be inclined to appraise
as flexibility and informality in an ALJ might strike others as inability or unwillingness to
maintain adequate control over the hearing. Some might be gratified by a judge's initiative in
deciding an ambiguous question of law whereas others might criticize such action as an
unwarranted appropriation of an agency prerogative.' Id. at 90.
Rosenblum recognizes that consistency in evaluation cannot be assured, but is
hopeful that, through preparation of a "brief manual for evaluating judges," including
consideration of input from various organizations such as the ABA National Conference of
Administrative Law Judges and the Administrative Law Section of the ABA, and the
Administrative Conference of the United States, along with the holding of seminars and moot
evaluation proceedings, consistency could be maximized. Id. at 90-91.
Rosenblum's observations regarding the possibility that different evaluators might
evaluate the same conduct differently are insightful. However, his answer may pose problems.
Even at the level of ALJs, while certainly there are areas of consensus on appropriate judicial
conduct, it is doubtful that such a universally-agreed-upon "recipe" for good judging can be
arrived at, and forcing a compromise on such issues as he describes in his definition of the
problem might well compromise not only independent decision-making, but also the sort of
creative improvements in performance that may more effectively be produced by fostering a
healthy atmosphere of collegiality in an office ofjudges, at whatever level. While consistent
standards of evaluation are to be desired from the standpoint of avoiding bias, there may also
be value in allowing for differences in style, and perhaps in this context allowing for, and even
encouraging, differences of opinion among those evaluating a particular judge might make for
less bias of the sort described by Prendergast.
324 See supra, text accompanying note 89.
,, See supra note 95.
26See supra note 123.
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to the sort of "yes" men and women described by Professor
Prendergast.
Surveys of counsel, litigants, and other participants in the
adjudicatory process may provide useful feedback on perceptions of
judicial performance by those who interact most closely with judges,
outside their own offices. Although such surveys are perceived by
many to be unreliable,' they may be helpful in addressing and
avoiding a myopic perspective on judicial performance. However,
great care must be taken with such surveys, to avoid any possibility of
inappropriate influence on judicial performance, or compromising of
judicial integrity and independence. As noted by Chief Judge Edwin
L. Felter, Jr., of the Colorado Division of Administrative Hearings,
such surveys should be used for developmental, self-improvement
purposes, and should be confidential with regard to individual judges. 2 s
Precautions should be taken to avoid any possible corrupting effect
on independent decision-making as a result of potentially identifiable
sources of positive or negative evaluations. Such surveys should not
carry any consequences with regard to pay or job security, unless
through such means conduct is discovered that would warrant
discipline, in which event proper procedures should be followed. It
should be recognized and acknowledged among all ALJs, and in any
voluntary publication of the results of such surveys, that such surveys
carry the inherent danger of including inappropriately negative
comments from parties who do not prevail in their cases. To the degree
possible, such surveys should be structured to minimize such an effect,
but the potential for such results should be openly acknowledged, to
prevent, as much as possible, any chilling effect on judicial
independence and appropriate performance of judicial duties.
As suggested by Judge Hoberg, appropriate means of
accomplishing meaningful and appropriate evaluation for self-
12See, e.g., the preface to the JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION HANDBOOK,
supra, note 3, at iii, in which Carl 0. Bradford, Chair of the National Conference of State Trial
Judges, refers to the "often meaningless clamor of a bar poll." See also Aynes, supra note 15,
at 270.
23Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Maintaining the Balance Between Judicial Independence and
Accountability in Administrative Law, 36JUDGES' JOURNAL, at 22, 54 (Winter, 1997), revised
and reprinted in this issue of the Journal of the NAALJ.
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improvement may include appropriate peer sharing, observation and
feedback, and constructive informal counseling. However, as with
surveys, peer sharing should not carry consequences with regard to pay
or job security. Informality and a respectful, nonthreatening, 129
collegial atmosphere should be created in order to enhance the value of
any peer observation and feedback that is done. If true self-
improvement of judges is desired, it may be more useful to approach
peer sharing as a voluntary, confidential process, rather than mandating
it, 3 ' which can create interactional problems in an office. In addition,
self-evaluation exercises, done with instruments created cooperatively
for this purpose, may prove helpful for individual judges.
To the degree evaluations are done by chief ALJs and/or other
supervising ALJs, there should also be a process for evaluation of
supervisors by supervisees, with the same precautions and caveats
discussed herein. This should assist in creating the sort of collegial
atmosphere that is to be encouraged, and could also be done as part of
an overall program of professional development for self-improvement.
All ALJs should be encouraged to discuss issues about which they
have questions, recognizing that in administrative law, many unique
and new issues arise that do not lend themselves to quick and easy
answers. While ALJ offices should maintain a level of dignity that
befits a judicial office, anything that smacks of judicial arrogance
should be discouraged; it should be recognized that humility is a good
quality in a judge, and is not the equivalent of weakness. Differences
of opinion should be acknowledged, accepted, encouraged, and
discussed openly, and all ALJs and staff in an ALJ office should be
assured that no questions are "stupid," nor will any questions or
'
29It has been observed that "[j]udges are more likely to change their ways when a
problem is brought to their attention in a nonthreatening way." Collins T. Fitzpatrick,
Misconduct and Disability of Federal Judges: The Unreported Informal Responses. 71
JUDICATURE 282, 283 (1988), cited in Timony, supra note 3, at 655.
'It is noted that in New Jersey, a committee on the peer review system of evaluating
judicial writing recommended against peer review, suggesting that only with one reader could
there be some assurance of the use of consistent standards of evaluation. However, the
committee stated that the system at the time was "doomed to failure so long as it is in any way
tied to financial reward or reappointment decisions." Peer sharing with no effect on job
security or benefits, undertaken in a non-threatening atmosphere of collegiality, should not
suffer from the same problem. Report of the Committee on Writing Evaluation, at 10. Copy
attached to October 31, 1996, letter from Jeff Masin. See supra, note 120.
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disagreement on issues be held against them later3 ' in any performance
evaluation or other context. This is necessary, to encourage more
effective performance of all duties at all levels.
Finally, constructive informal counseling and mentoring, along with
training, educational and professional development activities in areas
of perceived weakness, may be used with ALJs who have problems
with performance, just as informal mentoring, observation and feedback
can be used with new ALJs, to assure better performance. This should
be done'as much as possible in the same non-threatening, collegial
atmosphere that is described above, in order to achieve the best results.
E. Complaint and Disciplinary Procedures
Any problems deemed serious enough to affect an ALJ's job should
be handled through fair complaint and disciplinary procedures. A
system for providing an easy, but formalized, means of making
complaints against ALJs who are perceived as violating standards of
conduct or otherwise engaging in inappropriate conduct, and of
appropriately evaluating and resolving complaints against ALJs, should
be developed, which does not minimize serious complaints, but also
does not overemphasize complaints relating to the merits of cases, or
otherwise compromise independent decision-making.'32 All complaints
should be required to be written, to minimize problems of hearsay and
interpretation, and to mitigate any problem of frivolous complaints.
Any discipline and removal of ALJs should be accomplished
according to clearly defined procedures, based on the same principles
of due process and independent decision-making that exemplify the
American legal system and that ALJs should apply in the cases they
hear, and should be based on standards of conduct set forth in a
formally-adopted code ofjudicial conduct. Principles applicable to the
discipline of judges in the judicial system may and should be applied
to ALJs, although particular procedures may differ. For example, the
Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency, adopted by the
"'As Kaufman has observed in the context ofjudicial discipline, "there would be an
inevitable loss of frankness [between judges] if each participant feared that candor might one
day build a case against him." Kaufman, supra note 37, at 711.
132 See Felter, supra note 128, at 23.
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American Bar Association House of Delegates at the mid-year meeting
in San Antonio on February 3, 1997, provides for "notice and an
opportunity to be heard in an Administrative Procedure Act or other
statutory-type hearing and a finding of good cause by an impartial
hearing officer," prior to any action to remove, suspend, demote, or take
any disciplinary or other adverse action against an ALJ, including any
action that might later influence a reduction in force.133
A commission, panel, or "court of the administrative judiciary"
might also be established, either as an alternative or an adjunct to any
other procedures used, to consider complaints against ALJs, and issue
ethical opinions. ALJ offices might also consider approaching such
entities in the judicial branch, to establish working relationships, on
whatever level deemed appropriate in the jurisdiction.
The use of evaluations in connection with any discipline of ALJs
should be avoided, in order to avoid the negative consequences
discussed above, and to maximize the developmental, self-improvement
value of any evaluations that are done. Any evaluation sought to be
used in any disciplinary procedure against any ALJ should be
considered hearsay unless a specific evidentiary exception to hearsay
applies.
In sum, if a complaint involves anything other than frivolous
allegations, it deserves serious attention, both in the interest of the
public and the judge involved, and should result in discipline or
removal only after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, with
competent proof of wrongdoing or incompetence, and a determination
by an independent decision-maker or decision makers, applying the
principles of the American legal system.
V. Conclusion
The American legal system is designed to treat similarly-situated
persons as similarly as possible. This goal addresses a fundamental
human concern: that of fairness, a concern so basic that young children
understand it implicitly and sometimes demand it insistently. Present
calls for accountability and evaluation ofjudges, from a public that is
133 See supra note 107.
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discontent with our legal system, may indeed perhaps best be
understood as expressions -- more or less articulate -- of frustration with
a system that is perceived to be unfair; the most obvious example of
this is the very understandable concern for victims of crime. The
arguments of many in the academic and governmental communities
who advocate evaluation of ALJs are similarly often rooted in concerns
of fairness. " The administrative legal system, like the judicial branch,
must address these frustrations and concerns.
Our legal system includes numerous procedures and requirements
to assure that decisions are made fairly, the most important of which is
the participation of an independent decision-maker. The specifics of
other procedural protections of various constitutional rights may, and
no doubt will, be forever debated, as will the proper definition and
particulars of judicial independence. However, without judicial
independence, the basic fairness the public cries out for cannot be
achieved. And if the public, confronted with a multitude of painful,
sometimes complex problems, does not see the value of judicial
independence clearly, it is our responsibility as administrative law
judges and members of the legal/judicial community, to clarify the
issue. Without such clarification, even the best judicial evaluation
system will likely do little to assuage public concern about the
judiciary, including the administrative judiciary.
Instead, inappropriate evaluation of judges may actually lead to
greater unfairness, by compromising independent decision-making.
Any system of standards setting and enforcement for judges, including
ALJs, should be approached with this danger clearly in mind, in a very
real and practical sense.
Where evaluation of ALJs is mandated, close and careful attention
must be paid to the criteria and methods of evaluation that are used, to
avoid compromising decisional independence as much as possible.
Most importantly, whatever criteria or methods are used, ranking and
grading of ALJs should be avoided or minimized as much as possible,
as should tying evaluations to job security or benefits, in order not to
undermine independent decision-making, productivity, efficiency,
collegiality, and quality in work product. The use of surveys and other
'4See supra note 7.
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multi-rater systems may alleviate the potential for bias that may inhere
in evaluation by only one or two supervisors, but the use of multi-rater
systems does not eliminate any possibility of bias or inappropriate
influence, and can cause additional problems, which should be
acknowledged and addressed. Confidential, developmental evaluation
for self-improvement, including self-evaluation, peer observation and
sharing, informal counseling and feedback, along with training and
professional development activities in areas of perceived weakness, are
better approaches for improving judicial performance.
Where it is possible to avoid or minimize the use of traditional
management-by-objectives performance evaluation models, well-
thought-out alternative systems, developed collegially, which provide
for rigorous selection of ALJs, high standards of conduct, effective
continuing education and professional development, appropriate and
meaningful observation and feedback, fair evaluation of complaints,
and appropriate discipline and removal procedures, should more than
adequately accomplish the purposes of traditional performance
evaluation systems, without resulting in the negative consequences to
independent decision-making that can be entailed in purely traditional
models.
Indeed, what we can learn from current management theory and
research suggests that ALJs who meet rigorous selection standards,
maintain high standards of conduct and professionalism through such
means as continuing education programs and peer sharing, are aware of
fair and appropriate disciplinary and removal procedures, but are not
subject to traditional periodic performance evaluations, should be at
least as, if not more motivated to perform well as they would be if they
were subject to traditional management-by-objectives performance
evaluation, and should be more motivated to make all rulings and
decisions independently, according to the values of due process, based
solely on the facts and law of the cases before them. An alternative
system of selection, standards-setting and enforcement may, if
appropriately implemented, actually strengthen "weak" ALJs, by
encouraging collegial sharing and cooperation, enhancing the
responsibility of independent decision-making, and fostering
professional development and pride in work product.
Creating standards-setting and enforcement systems that take into
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account the basic principles of the American legal system and what we
can learn from the field of management should thus more effectively
both improve ALJ performance and encourage ALJ fulfillment of the
responsibility of independent, impartial, and fair decision-making. This
approach, along with appropriate public education activities, should
thereby better and more appropriately address public discontent with
the legal system, through reassurance that the system is in fact fair, as
it is intended to be.
If effective, independent decision-making is to be desired in
administrative adjudication, it should not be hampered by unintended
negative consequences of traditional evaluation systems, but rather
should be encouraged through a system of appropriate selection,
standards-setting and enforcement procedures, which will also better
assure efficiency and excellence in performance. If independent
decision-making is not actively and systematically fostered, what we
offer the public is the deception that decisions are independent when in
fact they may not be. The pejorative expression, "good enough for
government service," is not an appropriate maxim when due process,
equal justice under the law, and independent decision-making are at
issue. As administrative law judges, we should accept the
responsibility of independent decision-making, and the challenge of
creating systems that foster the effective fulfillment of this significant
and far-reaching responsibility.
